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Presently, U.S. border security endeavors are compartmentalized, fragmented, and poorly 
coordinated.  Moreover, international collaborations are extremely limited; success 
hinges on effective international cooperation.  This thesis addresses U.S. border security 
management using complexity theory and a systems approach, incorporating both borders 
and all associated border security institutions simultaneously.  Border security research 
has rarely viewed all stakeholders as a holistic unit up to this point, nor has border 
security been thoroughly examined using a systems approach.  This research scrutinizes 
the current U.S. border security paradigm in an attempt to determine the systemic reasons 
why the system is ineffective in securing U.S. borders.  Additionally, the research 
investigates the current level of international cooperation between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico.   
This thesis increases awareness and will possibly create dissent among established 
agencies, which is the first step in instituting needed changes that will ultimately increase 
North American security.  The thesis contends that the establishment of a tri-national—
United States, Canadian, and Mexican—border security agency, in addition to legalizing 
drugs and reestablishing a guest worker program, will be more effective and cost-
efficient in securing North American borders.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Mexico’s drug related death toll since 2006 is estimated to be over 45,000.  The 
majority of casualties have been members of criminal organizations, as the cartels fight to 
secure territory and trafficking routes into the United States.  The increased carnage is 
driven by U.S. consumption of illegal drugs, fueled by the influx of weapons from the 
United States, and funded by money flowing south.  According to Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) statistics, over 90 percent of confiscated 
weapons in Mexico are of U.S. origin.1 
Recently, U.S. concerns have focused on the potential of spillover violence from 
Mexico and terrorists crossing the border illegally.  Although, no terrorist has been 
apprehended attempting to cross the Mexican border into the United States, nor has there 
been any increase in violent crime along the border.  In fact, statistics show crime has 
actually decreased in border communities.2  
The current U.S. border security assumption maintains stopping the illegal 
crossings of drugs, people, guns, and money can solve most of the problems.  Some in the 
United States believe this can be simply accomplished by building a fence, adding more 
Border Patrol agents, or sending in the National Guard.  Terry Goddard, however, 
contends focusing on the border as a physical barrier is misleading, and the United States 
must view the border as “a complex, multidimensional interrelationship of immigration 
laws, cyberspace money transfers, and international business connections.”3   
                                                 
1 Terry Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Hit the Cartels Where It Hurts, Part I of III,” 
Immigration Policy Center’s Perspectives, September 2011, 4; Eric L. Olson, Andrew Selee, and David A. 
Shirk, Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime (Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute and Trans-Border Institute of the University of 
San Diego, 2010), accessed January 28, 2010, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/mexico, 1–47. 
2 Kristin M. Finklea, Willaim J. Krouse, and Marc R. Rosenblum, “Southwest Border Violence: Issues 
in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence,” Congressional Research Service Report R41075, August 
25, 2011, 9–23; Goddard, “Broken Border: Part I,” 4. 
3 Terry Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Hit the Cartels Where It Hurts, Part II of III,” 
Immigration Policy Center’s Perspectives, February 2012, 2. 
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U.S. border security endeavors are compartmentalized, fragmented, and poorly 
coordinated.  Moreover, international collaborations are extremely limited; success 
hinges on effective international cooperation.  Increasing North American security 
requires a reexamination of the current border security paradigm through a complexity 
theory and systems approach.  Doing so enables the projection of a new paradigm, which 
will strengthen North American security and prosperity.   
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis and associated analysis focuses on addressing the following specific 
research questions: 
• What is the goal of U.S. border security, and how can it be improved to 
accomplish this goal? 
• Would a tri-national—United States, Canadian, and Mexican—border 
security agency, developed using complexity theory and a systems 
approach, be more effective and cost-efficient in securing North American 
borders, and what are the roadblocks for the establishment of such an 
agency?  
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five main chapters following a logical scheme to 
answer the research questions posed.  Chapter II introduces the agencies currently 
involved in border security, the coordinating organizations established, and determines 
which, if any, agency has the overall lead in border security.  Chapter III examines the 
goals of U.S. border security, history of border security institutions in the United States, 
and forces shaping the border security framework.  The effectiveness and cost of present 
border security efforts are examined in Chapter IV.   
The previous chapters provide the foundation on which Chapter V builds upon.  
Chapter V introduces a proposed paradigm shift to increase North American security, 
namely the establishment of a tri-national border security agency, legalization of drugs, 
and recruitment of seasonal workers.  Additionally, the systemic effects, along with the 
cost, are explained.  Finally, Chapter VI presents bureaucratic, political, cultural, and  
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international barriers to the implementation of the proposed paradigm, solutions to 
transcending these barriers, and feasibility of establishing a tri-national border security 
agency. 
D. IMPORTANCE  
This thesis addresses U.S. border security management using complexity theory 
and a systems approach, incorporating both borders and all associated border security 
institutions simultaneously.  Border security research has rarely viewed all stakeholders 
as a holistic unit up to this point, nor has border security been thoroughly examined using 
a systems approach.  This research scrutinizes the current U.S. border security paradigm 
in an attempt to determine its effectiveness in securing U.S. borders from Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs), weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and illegal 
immigration.  Additionally, the research investigates the current level of international 
cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.   
This thesis increases awareness and will possibly create dissent among established 
agencies, which is the first step in instituting needed changes that will ultimately increase 
North American security.  The recommendations presented provide U.S., Canadian, and 
Mexican governmental leaders with a proposal to improve collaboration and 
effectiveness for border management.  
The governments and citizens of all countries have stakes in this objective and 
must care about addressing the threats to North American security.  Specifically, this 
thesis predominantly concerns the agencies affected and border residents.  The difference 
the thesis makes, if successful, is increased North American security through policies and 
practices that reduce violence, curtail DTO activities, and limit illegal border crossings 
that smuggle cash, weapons, and persons.  Impacts will be felt by citizens of all three 
countries, primarily those living along the U.S.-Mexican border who will be able to go 
about their daily lives without fear of being caught in the current crucible of violence. 
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E. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The research questions raise several important problems.  First, establishing a tri-
national border security agency introduces a host of problems.  Most importantly such a 
project raises the problems of bureaucratic resistance to change, reciprocal mistrust 
between countries, cultural stereotypes, and legislative dysfunction.  The larger challenge 
entails overcoming these barriers in a way that is acceptable both internationally and 
domestically.  In this connection, the initial hypothesis is the current highly partisan 
political environment in all three North American democracies and persistent domestic 
mistrust present will prohibit the establishment of a true tri-national agency; however, 
there may be some initiatives, reorganizations, or collaborations that can be implemented, 
domestically and internationally, to improve North American security.  Alternatively, the 
increase in public awareness of DTO violence may present an opportunity to establish a 
tri-national, or at least U.S.-Mexican bilateral, border security agency.   
Whatever the immediate fate of a tri-national border agency, the second and most 
fundamental question is: What is the goal of U.S. border security?  The complicating 
factors here include the ability to synergize efforts to accomplish a mission if one is not 
clearly stated, and the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of the organization in 
achieving its objectives.  Is the United States trying to stop illegal immigration, terrorists, 
drugs, migrant workers, or all of the above?  The hypothesis is that before 9/11, border 
security was focused on illegal immigration; it switched to terrorism after 9/11 and now 
is transitioning to stemming the flow of drugs.  It also may be found the United States 
does not have any one stated, coherent border security goal.  Answering this basic 
question allows the U.S. border security framework to be examined to look for ways to 
improve its effectiveness. 
Two additional questions must be addressed to determine the present shape and 
effectiveness of border security.  First, the current framework of border security must be 
assessed to describe existing conditions, thence to project a new, improved model.  The 
initial step is to determine which agencies have active roles in border security and how 
those agencies interact.  This assessment brings to the forefront the problem of 
fragmentation and compartmentalization of border security management.  The question 
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also encompasses coordination problems that arise with having numerous agencies 
involved in separate, often overlapping, areas of border security and the lack of overall 
effectiveness that this approach causes.  Moreover, this assessment sheds light on what 
the different actors and stakeholders want to do with their border security policies; 
bringing to the forefront how divergent, sometimes conflicting, goals lead to confusion.  
Finally, by observing the system, differences between stated, official objectives and 
emergent ones will be exposed.  The preliminary conclusion is that the proliferation of 
agencies involved in border security—especially in the absence of a central or 
coordinating authority—limits U.S. endeavors in combating drug, weapon, immigration, 
and money laundering.  An alternative conclusion, however, is that by having multiple 
agencies addressing border security through different perspectives actually intensifies the 
effectiveness of border security by increasing the number of “eyes” looking in different 
places and limiting groupthink.  
The next step in assessing the border security framework is to determine which, if 
any, agency leads U.S. border security efforts.  This question raises the problems of unity 
of effort, harmonizing the energies of several organizations to work toward a similar 
objective, and unity of purpose, constancy of goals across organizations.  If no one 
agency has overall control of border security, how are efforts being coordinated to ensure 
the accomplishment of stated objectives?  The initial hypothesis is no single agency has 
the overall lead in border security and this has led to a disjointed and ineffective approach 
to border security.  Alternatively, it may be found that in fact the United States does have 
a single agency in charge of border security, most likely the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), which is orchestrating U.S. border security efforts.  This alternative, 
however, raises the problem one departmental agency having oversight of agencies 
belonging to separate departments.  
Second, the level of international cooperation must be examined.  This aspect 
introduces the problem of unilaterally attacking border security without adequate 
international collaboration.  There are two sides to every border, and given the 
interconnectedness of borders, actions taken on one side affect both sides.  Additionally, 
the question brings to light the issue of the United States treating its borders with Canada 
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and Mexico as two separate, mutually exclusive entities.  Failing to have a unified border 
security plan leads to confusion, stemming from the inability to synchronize northern and 
southern border strategies.  Exploring the management of both borders can lead to lessons 
and practices that may be applied to both borders, increasing North American security.  
The preliminary conclusions are the level of international cooperation has to be increased 
to provide for more effective border security, and treating the borders as separate entities 
leads to confusion and a disjointed comprehensive border security plan.  On the other 
hand, it may be found the United States does have the needed international agreements in 
place, has a productive working relationship with Canada and Mexico, and indeed has an 
all-encompassing border security plan. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The basic premise of this thesis is border security is what Horst Rittel and Melvin 
Webber define as a “wicked problem.”4  Gregory Treverton describes wicked problems 
in the following manner: 
Wicked problems are ill-defined, ambiguous and associated with strong 
moral, political and professional issues.  Since they are strongly 
stakeholder dependent, there is often little consensus about what the 
problem is, let alone how to resolve it.  Furthermore, wicked problems 
won’t keep still: they are sets of complex, interacting issues evolving in a 
dynamic social context.  Often, new forms of wicked problems emerge as 
a result of trying to understand and solve one of them.5 
There are no clear solutions to wicked problems, but by involving all the 
stakeholders, these problems can be tamed.  In order to tame this wicked problem, this 
thesis will integrate a multitude of disciplines.  The intent of this literature review is to 
establish a fundamental level of understanding of the basic concepts that will be used 
throughout, beginning with a review of recent border security issues brought up from 
numerous sources.   
                                                 
4 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in general theory of planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4 (1973). 
5 Gregory F. Treverton, “Addressing ‘Complexities’ in Homeland Security,” Chapter 21 in The Oxford 
Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed. Loch K. Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 346. 
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The strengths and weaknesses of bureaucracies will be examined, along with 
Organizational Design Theory (ODT).6  This discussion will touch further on systems 
theory, complexity theory, and complex adaptive systems (CAS), incorporating Donella 
Meadows’ work on leverage points—places to intervene in a system.7  
Following the discussion on systems, this review will analyze the competing 
schools of thought in strategic planning, culminating with an examination into 
collaborative rationality.8  Finally, the Cynefin sense-making framework will be explored 
to determine which concepts are most appropriate in the realm of border security.9  
1. Border Security Issues 
Lack of coordination, collaboration, and information sharing are reoccurring 
criticisms of the border security system.  In a report on challenges in securing U.S. 
borders, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that information and 
resource sharing gaps remain in border security efforts, which if improved could enhance 
security on both borders.  Furthermore, the report stated that DHS management oversight 
has failed to ensure consistent compliance with established agreements.  This failure has 
led to local law enforcement agencies not receiving information from federal agencies.  
Additionally, the lack of information sharing mechanisms prevents local agencies from 
reporting suspicious activities because they do not know what information federal 
agencies are seeking.10 
In a report on firearms trafficking, the GAO found the ATF and U.S. 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) do not effectively coordinate efforts 
                                                 
6 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979); Charles Perrow, Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970). 
7 Donella H. Meadows, “Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System,” Sustainability Institute, 
December 1999; Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing Co., 2008); Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity (New York: 
Routledge, 2010). 
8 Ibid.; Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (New York: The Free Press, 1994).  
9 C. F. Kurtz and D. J. Snowden, “The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-makings in a complex and 
complicated world,” IBM Systems Journal 42 (2003). 
10 GAO Report, “DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern 
Borders,” March 30, 2011, 13–16. 
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because clarity is lacking in roles and responsibilities.  The result is a duplication of effort 
and confusion during operations.  Both agencies admit they have inadequate 
communication during investigations and are unwilling to share information, leading to 
dysfunctional operations.11 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on issues confronting law 
enforcement found U.S. law enforcement remains constrained by interagency 
disagreements over organizational boundaries, or the notion of “turf.”  Even with 
increased collaboration from interagency agreements, task forces, and fusion centers, 
these turf wars remain.12   
The same CRS report discovered that the Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector 
General observed that ATF does not consistently share intelligence with partner agencies, 
despite Memoranda of Understanding between agencies.  Additionally, the report cited 
that the GAO found when the number of involved agencies increased the more confusion 
on roles and responsibilities affected operations; 78 percent of agents reported that 
interagency disagreements adversely affected investigations.13   
Additionally, a CRS report on the role of the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) 
conveyed that the USBP fails to coordinate activities with other federal agencies 
operating along the border and neither USBP nor DHS has any plans detailing how 
interagency coordination should occur.  Also in the report, the GAO concluded that the 
lack of coordination has led to confusion, frustration, and a waste of law enforcement 
resources, limiting the effectiveness of federal efforts.14  
The growing numbers of Fusion Centers around the country have been 
proclaimed as a coordination success by DHS.  On the other hand, the CRS reports very 
little “true fusion” is occurring in these centers.  The Markle Foundation found the 
                                                 
11 GAO Report, “Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face 
Planning and Coordination Challenges,” June 2009, 3–29. 
12 Kristin M. Finklea, “The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues 
Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement,” Congressional Research Service Report R41927, July 19, 2011, 1. 
13 Ibid., 21–22. 
14 Chad C. Haddal, “Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol,” Congressional Research 
Service Report RL32562, August 11, 2010, 32. 
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information sharing framework has unfinished business to ensure every agency, including 
state and local, has the information required for national security.  Supporting this 
criticism, the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute discovered, despite 
national effort and resources, unity of effort continues to elude homeland security 
endeavors.15  
2. Bureaucratic Development 
Most of the above criticisms are grounded in the way bureaucracy’s function.  It 
is important to take a look at bureaucratic theory in order to grasp the dynamics before 
trying to propose solutions.  Charles Perrow believes bureaucratization stems from the 
thrust to limit uncertainty, routinize, increase predictability, and centralize functions and 
control.16  Organizations attempt to stabilize environmental influences by establishing 
rules and policies designed to deal with the environment on a routine and predictable 
basis.17  
Bureaucracies developed in the Middle Ages and have evolved continuously 
since, leading to what Max Weber termed “traditional bureaucracy.”  Perrow contends all 
large, complex organizations are bureaucracies to some degree.  Critics complain 
bureaucracies are unadaptive and stifle creativeness, but these traits are exactly what 
bureaucracies where created for—stability and predictability.  One characteristic of 
bureaucracies that is widely criticized is hierarchy, which is a primary source of delays 
and stifles the independence and creativity of subordinates.  Hierarchy, however, has the 
benefit of establishing communication routes and levels at which decisions can be made, 
and no formal organization can function without some established hierarchy.18   
                                                 
15 Todd Masse and John Rollins, “A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report RL34177, September 19, 2007; Nation At Risk: Policy 
Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country, The Markle Foundation Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age (March 2009): 1–2; H. Steven Blum and Kerry McIntyre, Enabling Unity 
of Effort in Homeland Response Operations, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (April 
2012): iii. 
16 Perrow, Organizational Analysis, 67. 
17 Ibid., 55. 
18 Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1986), 
3–40. 
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There are numerous schools of thought on how bureaucracies develop: classical 
management theory, human relations model, Neo-Weberian model, institutional school, 
and several economic theories.  The most applicable to border security management is the 
Neo-Weberian model that maintains humans are “intendedly rational.”  This is similar to 
the idea of “bounded rationality” developed by Herbert Simon.  The concept maintains 
that people attempt to be rational, but their limited capacities prevent complete rationality 
because people do not have complete knowledge of the consequences, both intended and 
unintended, of their actions; they do not have complete knowledge of the alternative 
courses of action available; and even when several alternatives are available they can not 
accurately rank them nor be sure which is the most desirable.19  
One important concept is contained in the Neo-Weberian model—contingency 
theory.  This provides independent leverage in constructing policies because it focuses on 
tasks and techniques of the organization rather than organizational structure and goals.  
This type of organization is difficult to bureaucratize because it contains non-routine and 
reactive tasks; however, it allows the occurrence of unexpected interactions to take place 
in complex systems, which can facilitate the development of positive synergies.20  
The Neo-Weberian model looks at organizational requirements in the realms of 
coupling and interaction.  Couplings are either tight or loose; tight coupling is preferred 
in organizations working within well-defined environments that require highly 
centralized decision-making and loose coupling is required for organizations dealing with 
highly unstable environments requiring decentralization.  Interactions are either linear or 
complex; linear interactions are again well established and complex interactions are non-
linear.  Border security management requires a loose coupling and complex interaction 
framework to enable creativity and alternative solutions.21 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 121. 
20 Ibid., 141–47. 
21 Ibid., 150. 
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3. Organizational Design Theory 
ODT has been extensively examined in literature and contains many schools of 
thought with varying degrees of terminology.  Contingency theory is one such school, 
which is based on the belief no one design is best in all situations and emphases the 
relationship between design and environmental variables. 22 
The contrast between mechanistic and organic organizations is the core of 
contingency theory.  Mechanistic organizations are highly centralized, formalized, and 
hierarchical, whereas organic organizations are decentralized, informal, and networked.  
Organizational forms vary to the degree in which they combine elements of both.  Henry 
Mintzberg identified five basic designs on a continuum, ranging from mechanistic to 
organic: machine, entrepreneurial, professional, adhocracy, and diversified.23 
Mechanistic bureaucracies are best associated with stable environments, while 
organic designs are most appropriate for complex environments containing high levels of 
uncertainty.  Contingency theory requires the creation of an adhocracy structure to 
adequately address the complex border security environment.  The diversified 
framework, the most purely organic design, does not allow centralized subunit control, 
which is needed to some degree in border security.  Adhocracies, on the other hand, are 
“organized to carry out expert work in highly dynamic settings, where the experts must 
work cooperatively in project teams, coordinating the activities by mutual adjustment, in 
flexible, usually matric forms of structure.”24  They draw together and synergize different 
experts’ complex skills to address issues in complex and dynamic environments. 
Treverton contends the traditional mechanistic organizations established in border 
security are not relevant in the highly complex border security environment.  To 
effectively tame the wicked problems facing border security, Treverton requires 
organizations to be able to make fast and comprehensive decisions.  The adhocracy 
                                                 
22 Mintzberg, Structuring of Organizations, 11. 
23 Mintzberg, Rise and Fall, 397–98. 
24 Ibid., 398. 
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structure enables this type of decision-making and would be useful in the establishment 
of a tri-national organization facing the complex environment of border security.25 
4. Governmental Bureaucratic Adaption 
Amy Zegart contends two basic realities make it difficult for government 
bureaucracies to adapt: nature of organizations and rational self-interests of political 
officials.  Organizational change comes about from two sources—internal and external.  
ODT explains the internal difficulties, while political science explains external 
impediments.26  
The most effective way for organizations to adapt is through internal changes; 
however, ODT establishes that internal change is hard to achieve.  Bounded rationality is 
the first reason, individuals have cognitive limits and changes that can improve 
performance are seldom identified or implemented.  The bureaucratic structure itself is 
another impediment.  The highly specialized nature of federal government agencies 
prevents knowledge transfer between agencies and often even within specific agencies 
themselves.  The very structure designed to increase agency efficiency hinders the 
agency’s ability to learn.  Finally, time prohibits adaptation.  The longer an agency is 
established the more resistant to change the agency becomes, as routines and norms 
become firmly entrenched.27   
Compared to private organizations, government agencies face three additional 
disadvantages that further limit internal change.  First, agencies are not faced with market 
competition that would force them to adapt.  Government organizations are designed 
from the beginning to be consistent and predictable, and not built to adapt.  Second, 
private firms have creators that want the organization to succeed; whereas, government 
organizations are often created by politicians who want them to fail for political purposes.   
 
                                                 
25 Treverton, “Complexities,” 349–51. 
26 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), Kindle edition, 43–
49. 
27 Ibid., 51–53. 
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Finally, governmental agency leaders are bound by legislation and do not have the 
freedom to change their organizations without going through the complex legislative 
process.28  
External change of government agencies comes from either executive branch 
action or legislative reforms.  Rational self-interest describes why external change is 
difficult.  Presidents are reluctant to pursue agency reforms without a crisis occurring in 
the presence of resistance, and legislators avoid reforms because reforms usually lack any 
benefit to their constituents; simply put reforms will not help them get re-elected.29 
5. Systems Theory, Complexity Theory, and Complex Adaptive Systems 
Government bureaucracies are forced to address the complex challenges of border 
security, which literature on systems theory, complexity theory, and CAS can be used to 
describe.  Hugh Miser and Edward Quade state, “systems analysis is the multidisciplinary 
problem-solving activity that has evolved to deal with complex problems that arise in 
public and private enterprises and organizations.”30  Systems analysis has to overcome 
several difficulties: inadequate knowledge, numerous disciplines involved, inadequate 
existing approaches, unclear goals, pluralistic responsibilities, resistance to change, and 
complexity.31 
Meadows defines a system as “an interconnected set of elements that is coherently 
organized in a way that achieves something…a system must consist of three kinds of 
things: elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose.” 32  Systems tend to 
produce their own behavior, which is not necessarily explicit.  The best way to deduce a 
system’s purpose is through observation.  This behavior adapts every time there is a 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 54–55. 
29 Ibid., 57 
30 Hugh J. Miser and Edward S. Quade, Handbook of Systems Analysis (New York: Elsevier Science 
Publishing Co., 1985), 15. 
31 Ibid., 14–15. 
32 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 11. 
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change in its elements, interconnections, or purpose.  The most drastic of which occur 
when a change in interconnections or purpose takes place.33 
System behavior consists of stocks and flows.  Stocks are the foundation, which 
contain measurable elements.  Flows are actions that change stocks over time.  Meadows 
uses a bathtub analogy to explain the relationship of stocks and flows; the water in a 
bathtub represents the stock and the faucet and drain represent flows.  Feedback 
processes regulate these flows, which can be both negative and positive.  Negative 
feedback processes maintain a stock within a range and positive feedback causes the 
stock level to either decrease or increase over time.  Delays in feedback loops are 
inherent in any system and cause oscillations over time.  This dynamic is key to 
understanding systems, as stocks change slowly because flows take time to flow.34  
Changing policies to affect system behavior is relatively easy in simple, linear 
systems; however, complex systems contain many non-linear relationships that are not 
intuitive.  This circumstance explains situations when policy makers change a system in 
some way, but the results have the opposite effect intended.  Policy makers are 
constrained by bounded rationality; studying systems allows a wider perspective reducing 
this constraint.35  
Moreover, complex systems tend to self-organize and are resilient to change.  Jay 
Forrester calls this principle compensating feedback, “when someone tries to change one 
part of the system, it pushes back in uncanny ways, first subtly and then ferociously, to 
maintain its own implicit goals.”36  Forrester also asserts that most of the problems 
organizations face are the result of their own policies, not problems induced by external 
actors.37 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 14–17. 
34 Ibid., 17–30. 
35 Ibid., 91–106. 
36 Lawrence M. Fisher, “The Prophet of Unintended Consequences,” Strategy and Business, Autumn 
2005, 3. 
37 Ibid., 6. 
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Complexity theory developed in the 1960s with the work of meteorologist 
Edward Lorenz.  Lorenz attempted to use linear equations to approximate non-linear 
weather phenomenon and found that minor alterations produced drastic changes.  This 
observation prompted the “butterfly effect” theory, which imagined a butterfly flapping 
its wings in South America affecting the weather in North Dakota.  Complexity theory 
focuses on how non-linear relationships produce unpredictable behavior in systems.38   
This field of study has merged with systems theory to develop the concept of 
CAS.  John Holland defines CAS as “systems that have a large number of components, 
often called agents, that interact and adapt or learn.”39  Emergent behavior is an essential 
characteristic of CAS.  Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez describes emergence as “the aggregation of 
simple behaviors at a local scale, bigger patterns emerge at the system scale, so the 
system self-organizes without any need of a centralized authority to ‘manage’ or plan 
those patterns.”40  This characterization supports Forrester’s compensating feedback 
principle. 
6. Controlling CAS 
E. Ahmed et al. believe that to understand CAS, the system must be studied as a 
whole, rather than decompose it into components.  They cite two sources of 
unpredictability in CAS: non-linear agent interaction and open nature of CAS where a 
perturbation in one system can affect other related systems.  Holland, however, offers an 
opportunity for understanding and controlling CAS: “all CAS that have been studied 
carefully exhibit lever points—points where a simple intervention causes a lasting, 
directed effect.”41 
                                                 
38 Innes, Planning with Complexity, 30–31. 
39 John H. Holland, “Studying Complex Adaptive Systems,” Journal of Systems Science and 
Complexity 19 (2006): 1. 
40 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “Complex adaptive systems and deviant innovation: the case study of the 
Mexican-American border,” (forthcoming): 2. 
41 Holland, “Complex Adaptive Systems,” 6; E. Ahmed, A. S. Elgazzar, and A. S. Hegazi, “An 
Overview of Complex Adaptive Systems,” Mansoura Journal of Math (2005): 2–3. 
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Meadows changes the term “lever points” into “leverage points,” which she 
defines as “places within a complex system…where a small shift in one thing can 
produce big changes in everything.”42  These points are normally not intuitive, and if 
they are policy makers tend to use them the wrong way making the initial problem worse.  
Meadows offers twelve leverage points that are inherent in any system (listed in 
increasing order of effectiveness): 
• Constants, parameters, and numbers—Parameters determine how much to 
change a flow into a system, but overall have little effect.  The majority of 
policy maker’s attention goes into changing parameters even though they 
have relatively little leverage. 
• Size of buffers—Buffers are the stabilizing stock in a system.  Increasing 
the buffer size will stabilize a system out of control, but if increased too 
much the system will become inflexible. 
• Structure of stocks and flows and nodes of intersection—Physical 
structures are critical in systems, but seldom a leverage point because 
changing the structure is rarely easy. 
• Length of delays relative to rate of system change—Feedback delays 
commonly are the source of oscillations, but delays are often out of a 
policy makers control and difficult to change. 
• Strength of negative feedback loops relative to the impacts they are trying 
to correct—Negative feedback loops can self-correct system behavior and 
it is important to ensure these feedback loops have enough strength to 
overcome the impact they are designed to correct. 
• Gain around driving positive feedback loops—If unchecked, positive 
feedback loops will destroy a system.  Reducing the gain accompanied by 
a positive feedback loop is usually a more powerful leverage point than 
reinforcing a negative feedback loop. 
• Structure of information flows—Adding a new information loop to the 
system will provide information where it was lacking, changing the 
behavior of the system. 
• Rules of the system—Rules define a system’s scope, boundaries, and 
freedom and can force drastic change into a system. 
• Power to add, change, evolve, or self-organize system structure—
Allowing a system to adapt over time increases its resilience.  Systems 
that cannot self-evolve are doomed to fail over the long run. 
                                                 
42 Meadows, “Leverage Points,” 1. 
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• Goals of the system—Changing the system’s goals alters all of the above 
leverage points to conform to the new goal. 
• Mindset or paradigm out of which the system arises—Paradigms are the 
source of systems and everything about a system is directly attributed to 
the paradigm; however, they are the most difficult system aspect to 
change. 
• Power to transcend paradigms—The ability to stay unattached to a certain 
paradigm, to be flexible, and to realize no one paradigm is true allows 
policy makers to choose whatever paradigm will enable the system to 
achieve its purpose. 
Meadows cautions that “the higher the leverage point, the more the system will 
resist changing it.”43  The concept of leverage points, however, provides valuable insight 
in how to control a CAS.44 
7. Strategy Formulation 
In The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Mintzberg defines planning as “a 
formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system 
of decisions.”45  Formalization contains three aspects: to decompose, to articulate, and to 
rationalize the processes decisions are made and integrated into an organization.  He 
continues by explaining that strategy is both a plan and pattern.  Strategies start as 
intended strategy, evolve into deliberate strategy after portions of the intended strategy 
become unrealized, and end up as realized strategy when deliberate strategy is combined 
with emergent strategy, Figure 1.46 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 19. 
44 Ibid., 2–19. 
45 Mintzberg, Rise and Fall, 12. 
46 Ibid., 12–24. 
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Figure 1.  Forms of strategy (After Mintzberg, 1994) 
Strategy formulation contains three steps.  First, the strategy must be codified by 
clearly expressing it in terms that enable it to be formally operational.  This step entails 
making assumptions explicit and uncovering and eliminating inconsistencies.  Second, 
the strategy has to be elaborated into specific action plans.  Third, the elaborated strategy 
must be converted into routine operations.47 
There are many schools of thought that attempt to explain the strategy process.  
Mintzberg describes ten distinct schools: design, planning, positioning, entrepreneurial, 
cognitive, learning, power, cultural, environmental, and configuration.  The first three are 
prescriptive schools focused on how strategies should be formulated.  The next six 
describe how strategies are made, and the configuration school combines them all.  In the 
realm of border security, discussion will be limited to the learning, power, and cultural 
schools.48 
                                                 
47 Mintzberg, Rise and Fall, 337–41. 
48 Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari (New York: The Free Press, 
1998), 5–6. 
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The cultural school explains how specific governmental agencies develop 
strategic plans.  Organizations over time develop internal cultures influencing the style of 
thinking, analysis, and in turn strategies.  Cultures also have the negative effect of 
making organizations resistant to strategic change.  Karl Weick states: “A corporation 
doesn’t have a culture.  A corporation is a culture. That is why they’re so horribly 
difficult to change.”49 
The power school sees strategy formation “as an overt process of influence, 
emphasizing the use of power and politics to negotiate strategies favorable to particular 
interests.”50  Graham Allison’s work examining the Cuban missile crisis is a 
comprehensive review of the dynamics internal politics play on strategy formulation.  
This school explains how the political process may be required to stimulate governmental 
agencies to change.51 
The learning school offers the best framework from the above schools of thought 
for border security strategy formulation.  Mintzberg describes, “According to this school, 
strategies emerge as people, sometimes acting individually but more often collectively, 
come to learn about a situation as well as their organization’s capability of dealing with 
it.  Eventually they converge on patterns of behavior that work.”52  A learning 
organization follows the following principles: learn from failure and success; reject the 
adage “if its not broken, don’t fix it;” assume workers closest to the processes know more 
than their superiors; seek to push information throughout the organization ensuring 
relevant knowledge is shared with units that need it the most; and spend time looking 
outside boundaries for knowledge.  Mintzberg proclaims: 
Some organizations face perpetual novelty.  In other words, their 
environments are dynamic and unpredictable, which makes it difficult to 
converge on a clear strategy at all.  In this case, the structure tends to take 
the form of adhocracy, or project organization, and the learning approach 
becomes almost mandatory—the means to work things out in a flexible 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 269–70. 
50 Ibid., 234. 
51 Ibid., 234–44. 
52 Ibid., 176. 
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manner.  At the very least, it allows the organization to do something—to 
respond to an evolving reality in individual steps instead of having to wait 
for a fully determined strategy.53 
This dynamic and unpredictable atmosphere describes the environment border 
security agencies are forced to deal with on a daily basis.54 
8. Collaborative Planning 
Collaborative planning builds on the basic assumptions of the learning school and 
is based on the concept of collaborative rationality, which is an alternative to traditional 
linear models.  It emphasizes expert knowledge and reasoning based on argumentation.  
Collaborative rationality was constructed from ideas created by the Frankfort School of 
critical theorists; specifically Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality, 
which contends results from deliberations can be viewed as rational.55   
Rational choice theorists also support collaborative rationality.  They discovered 
in certain situations, such as the prisoners’ dilemma, cooperation was the most rational 
choice.  John Forester brought the theory of communicative rationality into the realm of 
planning in his article “Critical theory and planning practice” and was further developed 
by Patsy Healey and John Dryzek.56 
Judith Innes believes three conditions must be met in order for collaborative 
planning to succeed: “These conditions include full diversity of interests among 
participants, interdependence of the participants, who cannot get their interests met 
independently, and engagement of all in face to face authentic dialogue.”57  She calls this 
the DIAD (diversity, interdependence, authentic dialogue) theory of collaborative 
rationality.58   
                                                 
53 Ibid., 229. 
54 Ibid., 214–15. 
55 Innes, Planning with Complexity, 6–23. 
56 Ibid., 20–25. 
57 Ibid., 35. 
58 Ibid., 35. 
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Four results often emerge during the collaborative planning process.  First, agents 
discover the reciprocal nature of their interests and learn achieving their goals are 
predicated on working together, rather than competing.  Second, lasting relationships are 
developed that continue after the process is completed.  Third, agents learn new actions 
and strategies they can use to achieve their objectives and also readdress their initial goals 
and interests in policy issues.  Finally, the process can lead to system adaptations that 
transcend the agreements made.59 
Collaborative planning is highly compatible with CAS because it focuses on the 
larger dynamic system as a whole, rather than simply its parts.  Additionally, 
collaborative planning not only produces effective options for institutions to address 
problems, but also facilitates individual and collective learning leading to system 
changes, making institutions more adaptive and resilient.60  
Susan Hocevar argues border security needs to develop collaborative capacity: 
A capacity for collaboration enhances the probability of mission 
completion by leveraging dispersed resources.  The benefits of developing 
collaborative capabilities include cost savings through the transfer of 
smart practices, better decision making as a result of advice and 
information obtained from colleagues, enhanced capacity for collective 
action by dispersed units, and innovation through cross-pollination of 
ideas and recombination of scarce resources.61 
Hocevar believes collaboration is a way to overcome institutional barriers 
stemming from conflicting missions by establishing common goals, recognizing 
interdependence, formalizing relationships, and creating lateral mechanisms.  
Additionally, William Jenkins contends DHS must create processes that provide 
incentives and rewards for collaboration.62 
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9. Cynefin Framework 
The Cynefin sense-making framework also supports the implementation of 
collaborative planning into border security.  David Snowden and Cynthia Kurtz, to 
challenge traditional ODT assumptions of order, rational choice, and intent, developed 
the Cynefin framework.  The framework is designed to enable decision makers “to 
consider the dynamics of situations, decisions, perspectives, conflicts, and changes in 
order to come to a consensus for decision-making under uncertainty.”63 
The framework consists of four domains—known, knowable, complex, and 
chaos—and an area of disorder separating the domains.  The known and knowable 
domains are ordered, consisting of linear cause and effect relationships.  While the 
complex and chaos domains are unordered, containing non-linear relationships.  In the 
known domain, the cause and effect relationships are known, translating into a decision 
model of sense-categorize-respond and the use of best practices.  The knowable domain 
contains cause and effect relationships that can be determined over time; the decision 
model for this area is sense-analyze-respond and the use of cooperation.  The complex 
area is the domain of complexity theory where emergent patterns emerge, but cannot be 
predicted.  This leads to the decision model of probe-sense-respond and collaborative 
planning.  In the chaos domain, there are no perceivable patterns and there is limited time 
to analyze.  The decision model for this area is act-sense-respond and use of authoritative 
methods is most appropriate.  Finally, the space between the four domains is an area of 
disorder where decision makers do not know which domain the situation they are in 
belongs.  Figure 2 depicts the Cynefin framework.64 
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Figure 2.  Cynefin framework (After Kurtz and Snowden, 2003) 
Christopher Bellavita, applying the Cynefin framework, suggests, “the most 
significant strategic issues the homeland security community will face in the next ten 
years are in the unordered domain of complex adaptive systems.”65  These problems are 
“open” because they will persist and cannot be fully resolved.  The use of planning 
methodologies that work well in the “known” and “knowable” domains are ineffective in 
a complex “open” environment.  Furthermore, Nieto-Gomez states, “the homeland 
security environment should be understood as a chaotic system where long term planning 
is very difficult.”66  When put into the context of the Cynefin framework, Nieto-Gomez’s 
use of the term “chaotic” can be translated as “complex.”67 
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10. Conclusion 
The literature clearly shows a lack of coordination and collaboration is hindering 
border security efforts.  This is partly explained by the bureaucratic processes in place.  
The Neo-Weberian model provides insight on how the border security bureaucracy, in 
order to become more effective, should transform into an adhocracy.  Zegart’s work 
introduced important concepts on the difficulties governmental organizations must 
overcome to adapt. 
Border security needs to be examined from a systems perspective, as its 
environment contains CAS whose patterns continually evolve.  Meadows’ leverage 
points provide effective places to intervene in systems, where small changes can have 
lasting effects.  Finally, the Cynefin framework suggests border security’s strategy 
formulation should be based on the model of collaborative planning, incorporating the 
tenants of Mintzberg’s learning organizations.  Doing so will enable border security 
institutions to move beyond merely sharing information to the realm of jointly creating 
information.68 
G. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a policy analysis using the meta-policy and policy process 
approaches, integrating multiple disciplines to examine the border security environment.  
The meta-policy approach explains the political and bureaucratic contextual factors 
affecting the structure of the border security system.  Policy process is used to clarify the 
role and influence of stakeholders within the policy process itself to identify possible 
solutions. 
This process starts by looking at established border security institutions and the 
forces shaping their development.  The thesis then examines the structure of the border 
security system in an attempt to provide policy makers suggestions on how better to 
organize to amplify collaboration and effectiveness, with the overall goal of increasing 
North American security. 
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II. SHAPE OF THE BORDER SECURITY SYSTEM 
The majority of research on border security has used a linear approach and limited 
its scope primarily to the DHS elements assigned to protecting the border: Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG).  This chapter introduces a number of agencies and institutions not 
normally associated with performing border security functions; yet through a systems 
perspective these agencies greatly affect border security and are critical to determine the 
shape of the system.  Defining the shape of the system is the first step in incorporating 
any change into a system. 
Whereas the linear approach in defining border security is too narrow, the most 
challenging aspect of using a systems approach is determining where to draw system 
boundaries.  The basic premise of systems thinking is that there are no separate systems; 
everything in the world affects everything else.  Meadows describes the nonexistence of 
boundaries: 
Systems rarely have real boundaries.  Everything, as they say, is connected 
to everything else, and not neatly.  There is no clearly determinable 
boundary between the sea and land, between sociology and anthropology, 
between an automobile’s exhaust and your nose.  There are only 
boundaries of word, thought, perception, and social agreement—artificial, 
mental-model boundaries.  The greatest complexities arise at exact 
boundaries.  There are Czechs on the German side of the border and 
Germans on the Czech side of the border.  Forest species extend beyond 
the edge of the forest into the field; field species penetrate partway into the 
forest.  Disorderly, mixed-up borders are sources of diversity and 
creativity.69 
There is no single correct boundary, and the establishment of any boundary 
introduces artificial problems.  For the scope of this thesis, the boundary is drawn around 
federal agency and institutional level entities directly influencing border security, along  
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with the major clandestine actors affecting border security.  This does limit the range and 
introduces a resemblance of linearity to this thesis, but is necessary in order to complete 
the project.70 
According to Meadows, a system contains three components: elements, 
interconnections, and a function or purpose.  Meadows uses a football analogy to explain: 
A football team is a system with elements such as players, coach, field, 
and ball.  Its interconnections are the rules of the game, the coach’s 
strategy, the players’ communication, and the laws of physics that govern 
the motions of ball and players.  The purpose of the team is to win games, 
or have fun, or get exercise, or make millions of dollars, or all of the 
above.71 
This chapter defines the first two components, elements and interconnections, of 
the border security system and also attempts to determine which, if any, agency has the 
overall lead in coordinating the system.  Chapter III details the system’s purpose by 
observing the system and explaining the forces shaping the system into what it is today.   
A. ELEMENTS 
Elements are the basic components and most visible parts making up any system.  
The border security system contains three distinct categories of elements: political, 
federal, and clandestine.  All elements interact with one another either directly or non-
directly, and all affect the way the system behaves. 
1. Political 
The political element is critical to include in a systemic analysis of border 
security.  Border security, in essence, is a political tool.  It is through the political element 
that the shape, priorities, limits, and functions of border security are established with 
laws, international agreements, oversight, and judicial rulings.  The political system 
contains instituted checks and balances to ensure proper system function. 
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a. Legislative 
Congress creates the laws that border security agencies are charged with 
enforcing.  The various committees and sub-committees perform oversight of agencies to 
ensure they are fulfilling their roles.  More importantly, Congress funds the agencies and 
determines the bureaucratic structure of the border security apparatus.  Additionally, 
Congress ratifies international agreements pertaining to border security. 
b. Executive 
The executive branch is charged with executing the laws passed through 
legislature.  The president sets the priorities and policies of the border security system 
and coordinates agency activities to accomplish their objectives.  Furthermore, the 
president negotiates international agreements and treaties with foreign governments, 
which is vital to the success or failure of any attempt to secure international borders. 
c. Judicial 
The judicial system ensures the laws passed, along with the enforcement, 
are legal and in accordance with the Constitution.  Judicial rulings are frequently the 
definitive point that laws and practices are either continued or stopped. 
2. Federal Agencies 
Federal agencies are the institutions charged with carrying out the daily activities 
pertaining to border security.  Each institution has its own unique history and culture, and 
collectively they work together pursuing the political system’s agenda. 
a. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
DHS is the main departmental level agency responsible for securing the 
U.S. border, and controls four separate agencies charged with border security: CBP, ICE, 
Transportation Security Agency (TSA), and Coast Guard.  Additionally, DHS contains 
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), which oversees lawful 
immigration to the United States.  The DHS website defines its border security mission 
as: 
 28 
Department of Homeland Security prevents and investigates illegal 
movements across our borders, including the smuggling of people, drugs, 
cash, and weapons.  The Department is working to strengthen security on 
the southwest border to disrupt the drug, cash, and weapon smuggling that 
fuels cartel violence in Mexico by adding manpower and technology to the 
southwest border.72 
DHS is the focal point of U.S. border security and is the agency that links 
its subordinate agencies to the political system.  Furthermore, DHS has the difficult task 
of coordinating its agencies activities to collectively accomplish the border security 
mission. 
b. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
CBP is the law enforcement arm of DHS providing front line responders 
to immigration and customs violations.  Their mission is to “prevent terrorists and 
terrorist weapons from entering the country, provide security at U.S. borders and ports of 
entry, apprehend illegal immigrants, stem the flow of illegal drugs, and protect American 
agricultural and economic interests.”73  CBP contains two, again separate, agencies that 
fulfill its mission: U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and Office of Field Operations (OFO).74 
CBP is the most visible agency protecting U.S. borders.  In addition to its 
stated mission and objectives, CBP must contend with changing priorities of other 
agencies, which affect the illegal flow of people, weapons, and drugs across the border. 
c. U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) 
Border Patrol agents enforce immigration laws between official ports of 
entry.  Their primary mission “is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of 
mass destruction, unauthorized aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers 
and other criminals” along 8,000 miles of the U.S. international border.  In recent years, 
USBP has been seen as the most important agency securing U.S. borders and its 
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appropriations have ballooned from $1.06 billion in 2000 to $3.58 billion in 2011—an 
increase of 238 percent.  Additionally, its manpower has more than tripled over the past 
decade to over 20,000 agents.75 
d. Office of Field Operations (OFO) 
OFO customs agents are responsible for conducting immigrations, 
customs, and agricultural inspections at official ports of entry.  The agents verify travel 
documents, collect customs, ensure both imports and exports are in compliance of U.S. 
laws, inspect for contraband, and confirm that agricultural products comply with animal 
and plant protection laws.  OFO forms the largest component of CBP, with over 28,000 
employees and a budget of over $3.5 billion a year.  Agents man 20 major field offices, 
331 ports of entry, and 70 locations in over 40 countries.  Agents are provided a broad 
range of powers, which includes the ability to inspect all persons, vehicles, merchandise, 
and baggage entering from foreign countries.76 
e. U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
ICE performs the investigative and intelligence functions of DHS, whose 
“mission is to detect and prevent terrorist and criminal acts by targeting the people, 
money, and materials that support terrorist and criminal networks.”77  A CRS report 
provides a detailed description of ICE activities: 
Unlike CBP, whose jurisdiction is confined to law enforcement activities 
along the border, ICE special agents investigate immigrations and customs 
violations in the interior of the United States. ICE’s mandate includes 
uncovering national security threats such as weapons of mass destruction 
or potential terrorists, identifying criminal aliens for removal, probing 
immigration-related document and benefit fraud, investigating work-site 
immigration violations, exposing alien and contraband smuggling 
operations, interdicting narcotics shipments, and detaining illegal 
immigrants and ensuring their departure (or removal) from the United 
States. ICE is also responsible for the collection, analysis and 
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dissemination of strategic and tactical intelligence data pertaining to 
homeland security, infrastructure protection, and the illegal movement of 
people, money, and cargo within the United States.78 
Even though ICE’s main focus in on interior enforcement, they are a 
critical component to the border security network.  ICE employs over 20,000 people and 
is provided $5.44 billion in funding.79   
f. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 
The homeland security role of the Coast Guard is to protect U.S. ports 
from terrorist threats and “maintain maritime border security against illegal drugs, illegal 
aliens, firearms, and weapons of mass destruction.”  The Coast Guard is a standalone 
agency within DHS and is the lead agency in maritime law enforcement.  It is charged 
with protecting over 361 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline.  Additionally, the Coast 
Guard performs important intelligence activities within DHS and the national intelligence 
system.  The agency is appropriated over $10 billion annually and contains close to 
50,000 military and civilian employees.80 
g. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
DOJ is another department level agency that is intricately involved in 
border security missions.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
and National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) are four distinct agencies inside DOJ who 
all have roles to play.  DOJ’s mission statement, according to its website, is: 
To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according 
to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to 
provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just 
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punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and 
impartial administration of justice for all Americans.81 
Although not specifically charged with securing U.S. borders, all of the 
above DOJ agencies’ missions have significant border functions and must coordinate 
closely with DHS to successfully accomplish their goals. 
h. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) 
ATF was moved to DOJ from DHS in 2003, along with its law 
enforcement functions formally under the Department of the Treasury.  ATF’s mission is 
to “protect our communities from violent criminals, criminal organizations, the illegal use 
and trafficking of firearms,…[and] acts of terrorism.”82  The ATF is the main agency 
charged with curtailing the flow of weapons into Mexico, which entails a great level of 
coordination with CBP. 
i. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
DEA’s website defines its mission as: “To enforce the controlled 
substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil 
justice system of the United States…those organizations and principal 
members…involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances…destined for illicit traffic in the United States.”83  The primary 
responsibilities of the DEA include: investigation of major violators of controlled 
substance laws operating at interstate and international levels; investigation of drug 
gangs; management of the national drug intelligence program; seizure of assets traceable 
to drug trafficking; coordination of drug enforcement efforts; and is responsible for all 
drug enforcement programs in foreign countries.84 
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DEA’s involvement in border security has increased in recent years due to 
the fact the majority of illegal drugs are smuggled across the U.S.-Mexican border.  In 
order to fulfill its mission, the DEA must work closely with CBP agencies to interdict 
illegal drugs flowing across U.S. borders. 
j. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
The FBI’s website defines its mission as: 
As an intelligence-driven and a threat-focused national security and law 
enforcement organization, the mission of the FBI is to protect and defend 
the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to 
uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide 
leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and 
international agencies and partners.85 
Combating transnational criminal organizations and enterprises is included 
in a list of FBI priorities and is how the organization fits into border security, namely 
fighting Mexican DTOs.  DHS relies on the FBI’s investigative abilities, along with its 
intelligence collection resources to secure U.S. borders.  
k. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) 
NDIC provides drug-related intelligence to the FBI, DEA, and other 
agencies.  It combines and analyses data obtained from federal, state, and local law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies in order to reduce the effects of drug trafficking, 
drug abuse, and other drug-related activities.  Additionally, NDIC is involved in reporting 
the methods drug traffickers use to launder drug proceeds, which is used to enhance 
money laundering strategies.  All border security institutions depend on NDIC 
intelligence to complete their respective missions.86  
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l. U.S. Department of the Treasury (DOT) 
DOT is an additional department level entity performing a role in border 
security.  DOT combats DTOs by working with other federal agencies to target the 
financial support networks used by the organizations.  DOT has the resources and 
knowledge needed to attack money laundering, stopping the flow of drug proceeds back 
to DTOs is critical to the success of any effort in curtailing DTO activities and securing 
North American borders.  DOT must work closely with DHS and DOJ agencies, along 
with international financial entities, to stem the financing of illegal cross-border 
activities.87 
m. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 
ONDCP is a component of the Executive Office of the President, created 
by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.  ONDCP produces the National Drug Control 
Strategy and coordinates both drug-control activities and funding across the federal 
government.  ONDCP is an essential link between border security agencies and the 
political system.  The office details the priorities of border security pertaining to drug 
activities and has substantial control of agency budgets.88  
n. Mexican Military 
In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderon stated DTOs were a national 
security threat and ordered the Mexican military to directly combat DTOs.  The military 
was called into action primarily because of widespread corruption and weakness of 
Mexican police forces.  Their role has continued to increase, and close to 45,000 troops 
have been deployed throughout the country to fight DTOs.  Given DTOs are the primary 
sources of human and drug smuggling into the United States, the Mexican military’s war 
against DTOs directly influences border security.89   
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o. Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP)   
SSP is part of the Federal Civil Service whose aim is to “preserve 
freedom, order and public peace, and to safeguard the integrity and rights of the people 
by preventing the commission of crimes.”90  The SSP contains the Federal Police force, 
which, along with the Mexican military, has been directly engaged in combating DTOs.  
As with the Mexican military, SSP’s fight against DTOs greatly affects North American 
security. 
p. Federal Police (PF) 
PF was created in 1999, replacing the corrupt Federal Preventive Police 
and is the most prolific police force in Mexico.  PF is a nation-wide force with large 
investigative powers and contains several elite units specifically created to combat DTOs.  
Their actions against DTOs, again, influence border security institutions in the United 
States.91 
q. Ministerial Federal Police (PFM) 
PFM performs investigative functions for the Attorney General of Mexico 
and replaced the corrupt Federal Investigations Agency.  PFM can be viewed as the FBI 
of Mexico, and its intelligence and investigative abilities directly contribute to securing 
the U.S.-Mexican border.92 
r. Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit 
This agency deploys customs officers at official border crossings to 
interdict contraband entering Mexico.  In order to curtail the flow of illegal weapons into 
Mexico, Secretariat agents need to closely coordinate with the ATF.93 
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s. Bank of Mexico 
The Bank of Mexico employs a security division charged with combating 
money laundering.  To be successful, the Bank of Mexico needs to work closely with 
DOT and NDIC, along with other U.S. and Mexican border security agencies, to stem 
financing from the illegal drug trade.94 
t. Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) 
Created in 2003, CBSA combined the interdiction and law enforcement 
functions of Citizenship and Immigration Canada with the customs function previously 
performed by Canada Customs and Revenue into a single agency.  CBSA is Canada’s 
CBP and is a critical component to the border security apparatus.  CBSA works closely 
with CBP agencies to secure the U.S.-Canadian border on a daily basis.95 
u. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
RCMP is Canada’s national police service, which enforces both federal 
and provincial law throughout Canada.  RCMP has the primary investigative 
responsibility for terrorism related offenses, in addition to using its intelligence apparatus 
to investigate organized crime, high-technology crime, and illegal migration.  RMCP can 
be viewed as Canada’s FBI, albeit with a much greater span of control.  RMCP’s 
intelligence and investigative functions are critical to securing the U.S.-Canadian border 
and works closely with its U.S. counterparts.96 
v. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 
CSIS is a domestic civilian agency created in 1984 that investigates, 
analyzes, and advises governmental agencies on activities suspected of constituting 
threats to Canada’s national security.  Additionally, CSIS conducts security assessments  
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of all federal government agencies, except RCMP, and vets immigration, citizenship, and 
refugee applicants referred from CBSA.  As with RMCP, CBSA’s investigative function 
is vital to the border security system.97  
w. Public Safety Canada (PS) 
Established in 2003 to facilitate coordination across federal departments 
and agencies responsible for Canadian national security, PS is essentially Canada’s DHS.  
The Minister of PS has control over CBSA, RCMP, and CSIS.  PS’s mandate is to keep 
Canadians safe from risks ranging from natural disasters to crime and terrorism.  PS 
works closely with its U.S. sister agencies to secure North American borders.98 
3. Clandestine Actors 
Clandestine actors greatly affect the function of the system and are essential to 
include in a systemic analysis of border security.  In turn, the official system affects the 
function of clandestine actors, as they innovate their processes to adapt to the legitimate 
components of the network.  The primary clandestine actors operating in the realm of 
border security are Mexican DTOs and the emerging role of clandestine networks 
remains quite pervasive.  By their very nature, DTOs are more dynamic than 
bureaucracies, which allow them to be more adaptive.  The names and territorial 
placement of specific cartels is very fluid and constantly changing; whereas established 
bureaucracies tend to be permanent.  This section introduces the seven most prolific 
organizations.  Figure 3 provides a map of areas of DTO influence in Mexico. 
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Figure 3.  Areas of DTO influence in Mexico (From DEA, http://www.dea.gov) 
a. The Gulf Cartel 
The Gulf Cartel is based out of Matamoros in Tamaulipas, directly across 
the border from Brownsville, Texas.  The group started bootlegging in the 1920s and 
began moving to cocaine during the 1980s with the crackdown of Caribbean smuggling 
routes.  It was considered Mexico’s most powerful DTO when it controlled Los Zetas to 
enforce its smuggling routes.  Los Zetas, however, defected in 2009, and the Gulf Cartel 
is currently battling the new organization for control of smuggling routes in Tamaulipas, 
Nuevo Leon, and Veracruz.99 
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b. Los Zetas 
Los Zetas was formed when members of an elite airborne special forces 
unit deserted from the Mexican military between 1996 and 2000.  Initially working as 
assassins for the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas broke away and became an independent DTO in 
2009.  Los Zetas has the distinction of being the most violent DTO in Mexico and is 
engaged with the Gulf Cartel over control of trafficking routes in Tamaulipas.  The 
organization has also expanded its operations to Zacatecas, Veracruz, Tabasco, 
Campache, Quintana Roo, and Chiapas, in addition to increasing its influence into 
Guatemala in an effort to control cocaine shipments from Central America to Mexico.  
Furthermore, Zetas is believed to be the most diversified DTO in Mexico, continually 
adapting into other criminal activities.100, 101 
c. La Familia Michoacana (LFM)/Knights Templar (Caballeros 
Templarios) 
LFM’s roots trace back to the 1980s, ironically starting out as a vigilante 
group aimed at eradicating drug use in Mexico, and is based in the state of Michoacán.  
The organizations founder, Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, required members to carry a 
“spiritual manual” giving the organization overtones of a religious cult.  LFM 
transformed into a DTO specializing in methamphetamine production and smuggling, 
gaining notoriety for beheadings of those who fail to conform to its code of conduct.  
Once aligned with Los Zetas, it is currently in direct confrontation with the 
organization.102 
Gonzalez was killed during a shootout with security forces in 2010, and 
the majority of LFM members have defected into a new organization, Caballeros  
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Templarios (Knights Templar).  Knights Templar continues to use religious rhetoric, 
even publishing an ethics booklet, and has been used by the Sinaloa cartel as a proxy to 
fight against Los Zetas.103  
d. Sinaloa Cartel 
The Sinaloa cartel is the most powerful and influential DTO in Mexico 
and was established in the mid-1990s in the state of Sinaloa.  Billionaire Joaquin “El 
Chapo” Guzman, the most wanted drug trafficker in Mexico, heads the organization.  The 
Sinaloa cartel moves cocaine from South America into the United States and controls an 
estimated 45 percent of Mexico’s drug trade.  Additionally, the cartel is suspected to have 
a presence in over 50 countries, making it the most powerful mafia organization in the 
Western Hemisphere and is considered the most cohesive DTO.  Sinaloa is currently 
battling other cartels for control of key smuggling routes along the New Mexico and 
California borders.104 
e. Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) 
BLO was initially affiliated with the Sinaloa cartel and controlled border 
access along Sonora state, however, after the arrest of one of its founding members in 
2008, assisted by a reported betrayal from “El Chapo” Guzman, the organization broke 
away.  The organization is believed to have infiltrated the upper echelons of Mexican 
government and has executed uncooperative officials, most prolifically the acting Federal 
Police director Edgar Millan Gomez.  BLO has secured trafficking routes in Sinaloa, 
Durango, Sonora, Jalisco, Michoacan, Guerrero, and Morelos and has formed an alliance 
with Los Zetas to fight against the Gulf, Sinaloa, and La Familia cartels.105   
f. Juarez Cartel 
The Juarez cartel is based in Cuidad Juarez, directly across the border 
from El Paso, Texas.  The cartel was originally part of the Sinaloa federation, but split 
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from the organization in 2008.  Since then, the cartel, along with its enforcement arm, La 
Linea, largely composed of corrupt police officers, has been engaged in a horrific conflict 
with the Sinaloans over control of the Cuidad Juarez trafficking corridor.  The conflict 
has claimed the lives of thousands, making the Mexican state of Chihuahua the deadliest 
in Mexico.  The Juarez cartel was responsible for the murder of a U.S. Consulate 
employee, along with her husband, in 2010.  The violence has taken a toll on the Juarez 
cartel; however, during its height the cartel was assumed to be responsible for half of all 
the illegal drug traffic between Mexico and the United States.106 
g. Tijuana Cartel 
The Tijuana cartel was created by one of the original founders of modern 
Mexican DTOs, former police officer Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo.  Gallardo was 
arrested in 1989 for the murder of a DEA agent.  The cartel was originally aligned with 
the Sinaloa cartel and was one of the largest and most violent DTOs in Mexico.  In 2008, 
the organization split from the Sinaloa cartel and has continually diminished since, as the 
Sinaloa cartel exerts its power taking over trafficking routes into the United States.107 
B. INTERCONNECTIONS  
Systems contain both formal and informal interconnections, which serve as the 
medium for interaction between elements and hold the elements together.  
Interconnections also very in form, some are institutional in nature, while others are 
unofficial.  Through these interconnections, system elements affect one another, in 
addition to overall system behavior.  Interconnections are more difficult to determine 
than elements; however, interconnections are more important to system function than 
elements.  Meadows writes, “A system generally goes on being itself…even with 
complete substitutions of its elements—as long as its interconnections and purposes 
remain intact.”108   
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1. El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 
EPIC is a national tactical intelligence center providing law enforcement agents, 
investigators, and analysts access to participating agencies’ databases.  It also delivers 
direct tactical intelligence support to state and local law enforcement agencies.  EPIC 
contains members from: DEA, DHS, CBP, ICE, USCG, FBI, ATF, U.S. Secret Service, 
NDIC, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of Defense (DoD), Texas 
Department of Public Safety, Texas Air National Guard, and El Paso County Sheriff’s 
Office.109  
2. Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) 
BEST is an ICE-led task force “designed to increase the flow of information 
between participating agencies regarding transnational criminal organizations and violent 
gangs operating along our [U.S.] borders…targeting the underlying source of cross 
border violence along the SWB: weapons smuggling, narcotics and human smuggling as 
well as bulk cash smuggling.”110  BEST contains members from: ICE, CBP, U.S. Secret 
Service, DEA, ATF, FBI, USCG, SSP, and local and state law enforcement agencies.  
Additionally, BEST units along the northern border contain members from: CBSA, 
RCMP, and provincial law enforcement agencies.  Currently, there are 32 separate BEST 
units in the United States and Mexico.111 
3. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) 
IBETs are U.S. and Canadian bi-national law enforcement teams targeting cross-
border criminal activity between official ports of entry.  IBETs are comprised of five core  
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law enforcement partners: CBSA, RCMP, CBP, USCG, and ICE.  IBETs currently 
operate in 15 regions along the U.S.-Canada border.  Their goal is to ensure the border 
stays open to business, but closed to crime.112  
4. Sensitive Information Unit (SIU) 
DEA created the Mexican SIU in 1997, whose mission is to train Mexican 
counterparts to work in sensitive bilateral investigations.  Members undergo training at 
the DEA Training Academy and perform work on behalf of the DEA.113  Most of SIU’s 
details are classified and cannot be discussed publicly. 
5. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program (HIDTA) 
HIDTA was created by Congress in 1988 and overseen by the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy.  HIDTA provides assistance to federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies operating in critical drug-trafficking areas.  The purpose is to 
reduce drug trafficking by facilitating cooperation among federal, state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement agencies, sharing information, and coordinating enforcement activities.  
Presently, there are 28 HIDTAs in operation throughout the United States.  Additionally, 
57 Intelligence and Investigative Support Centers assist HIDTAs to identify targets and 
trends; develop threat assessments; de-conflict targets and events; and manage cases.  
Members include: DEA, FBI, ICE, local, and state agencies.114 
6. Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) 
ACTT was created in 2009 to combat individuals and criminal organizations 
posing threats to border communities in both the United States and Mexico.  Its aim is to 
leverage the capabilities and resources of over 60 federal, state, local, and tribal agencies 
by increasing collaboration to counter the threats of transnational criminal organizations 
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operating in the Arizona corridor.  Members include: USBP, CBP, ICE, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, Bureau of Land Management, Pinal County Sheriff’s Office, and Gila River 
Police Department.115 
7. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) 
Started in 1982, OCDETF combines federal, state, and local law enforcement 
efforts to comprehensively attack organized crime and drug traffickers.  OCDETF’s 
mission is to reduce the supply of illegal drugs and diminish violence associated with the 
drug trade.  Managed by DOJ’s Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 
Task Forces, OCDETF combines members from: DEA, FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals 
Service, IRS, ICE, and USCG.  The major functions are: identify and target drug 
trafficking and money laundering organizations; disrupt and dismantle drug and money 
laundering organizations; and conduct coordinated investigations against targeted 
organizations.  The OCDETF also operates a separate Fusion Center, which integrates 
drug and financial information from member agencies.116 
8. Southwest Border Initiative (SWB) 
 SWB, started in 1994, is a federal law enforcement operation attacking Mexican 
DTOs by targeting their communication systems—enabling the tracking of drug flows 
from Mexico to U.S. streets.  Members include: DEA, FBI, CBP, ICE, and U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices.117 
9. Southwest Border Intelligence Collection Plan (SWBICP) 
SWBICP is a DEA program initiated in 2009 to provide regional intelligence 
collection supporting Southwest border enforcement operations.  The organization’s aim 
is to deliver operational, tactical, strategic, and policy-level intelligence enabling 
investigations, regional planning, and resource decision-making.  Additionally, it collects 
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information to access effectiveness of counterdrug measures along the Mexican border.  
The information gathered is shared with the intelligence community and other federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies.118 
10. Special Operations Division (SOD) 
SOD is a DEA-led multi-agency whose “mission is to establish seamless law 
enforcement strategies and operations aimed at dismantling national and international 
trafficking organizations by attacking the command and control communications.”119  
The agency facilitates coordination of overlapping investigations and operations ensuring 
intelligence sharing and unity of effort.  Johnny Dwyer in a Time magazine article 
describes SOD agents as “the Navy SEALS of the DEA.”120  As with the SIU, most of 
the details of SOD are classified. 
11. Covert Operations 
Along with the publicly acknowledged institutions, there are mounting reports of 
several covert U.S. and Mexican bi-national efforts fighting DTOs.  The New York Times 
reports Mexican commandos, with DEA assistance, are staging missions from the United 
States, American Predator and Global Hawk drones flying deep into Mexico, and 
intelligence outposts, manned by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DEA operatives, 
on Mexican military bases.  Additionally, there are reports of the establishment of an 
Office of Bi-National Intelligence (OIB) in Mexico, comprising members from the 
National Security Agency (NSA), FBI, DEA, and ATF.121 
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12. DTO Alliances 
DTOs continually shift alliances and form coalitions fighting each other.  
Currently, the seven main organizations form two competing blocs.  The Sinaloa, Gulf, 
and La Familia cartels formed a pact, known as the New Federation, in 2010.  The other 
DTOs share a loose connection with one another to counter the New Federation, which 
continuously evolves.122 
13. Corruption Networks 
Every DTO maintains a vast network of corrupt officials.  In 2010, over 3,000 
Mexican Federal Police members were fired due to ties to DTOs.  The Mexican military 
has also recently been plagued by corruption; four high-ranking officers—including three 
generals—in the Mexican army were arrested on corruption charges in 2012.123   
Corruption has spread across the border, in 2012 the DHS Inspector General had 
over 370 open cases regarded corruption involving ICE and CBP employees.124  
Additionally, 138 CBP members have been arrested or indicted for corruption acts since 
2004, including drug and alien smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy.125 
14. Financial Laundering Networks 
Mexico’s Ministry of Finance estimates Mexican DTOs laundered approximately 
$10 billion during 2011, with the drug trade accounting for over 40 percent of the 
proceeds.  The U.S. government, however, estimates that between $22 and $29 billion in 
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drug profits are laundered every year.126  The United States and Mexico formed the 
Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group in March 2012 to coordinate the 
investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling.127 
15. DTOs and Gangs 
DTOs have many links to gangs, and as businesses they look for ways to 
distribute their product in the most cost effective way.  DTOs are the major wholesalers 
of drugs in the United States and have increased their distribution networks through 
alliances with gangs inside the United States.  Currently, DTOs maintain a presence, 
through surrogate gangs, in over 1,000 U.S. cities.  Resulting from the innovation process 
adapting to legitimate system elements, these interconnections are ever evolving.128 
16. DTOs and Border Security Entities 
DTOs are connected to every border security entity through the “cat and mouse” 
game they play every day.  The border security side wants to catch and incarcerate the 
clandestine actors who attempt to smuggle drugs, money, weapons, or people across the 
border.  In many ways this link is the most important one in the system; without this link 
neither border security agencies nor DTOs would be able to define themselves.  Each 
entity depends on the other for its own survival; if no border security agencies existed, 
smuggling illegal goods would not require DTO sophistication.  Moreover, this link 
forces each organization to continually adapt the way it operates—a process that will 
continue for as long as the organizations are in existence. 
C. LEAD AGENCY 
In its current form, the border security system lacks any clear lead agency, Figure 
4.  There are three distinct departmental agencies preforming border security tasks: DHS, 
DOJ, and DOT, in addition to the ONDCP contained within the president’s executive 
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office.  Furthermore, within each departmental agency there are numerous separate 
agencies, with varying missions and goals, charged with executing different aspects of 
border security.  The abundance of domestic and international interconnecting institutions 
further dilutes and prevents any coherent centralized control of the system.   
 
Figure 4.  Border security system 
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III. EVOLVING GOALS OF BORDER SECURITY 
This chapter observes the development of U.S. border security to determine 
observable patterns and the forces that have shaped the system.  Enabling the discovery 
of system goals—both stated and implied.  Meadows writes, “A system’s function or 
purpose is not necessarily spoken, written, or expressed explicitly, except through the 
operation of the system.  The best way to deduce the system’s purpose is to watch for a 
while to see how the system behaves.”129 
The most basic function of a border security system is to safeguard the territorial 
integrity of a state and enforce a country’s immigration and commerce laws.  Border 
security acts as flow management—selective system gates discriminating flows.  Border 
security prevents illegal immigration and the smuggling of both legal and prohibited 
goods.  This function protects the state’s territorial integrity.  Border security also 
performs a facilitation function assisting the legal entrance of immigrants and visitors 
into a country.  Additionally, border security facilitates international commerce by 
collecting tariffs and confirming that goods comply with national agricultural and safety 
standards.   
Border security and the effort to restrict territorial access has always been a core 
activity of states.  Peter Andreas writes, “As territorially demarcated institutions, states 
have always imposed entry barriers, whether to deter armies, tax trade and protect 
domestic producers, or keep out perceived ‘undesirables.’”130  These priorities, however, 
continue to evolve throughout history.  Border security began as traditional military 
defense of territory performed by military entities and has given way to more intensive 
law enforcement activities aimed at controlling and taxing the flow of persons and goods 
performed by non-military agencies.131   
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Beginning with the very first acts of Congress, the history of border security 
institutions and their functions are traced.  Followed by a discussion of the forces shaping 
border security, and a look at how shifting priorities have changed the structure of the 
federal government.  Finally, the current goal of U.S. border security is examined.  
Chapter IV will ascertain the system’s effectiveness in accomplishing its stated and 
implied goals. 
This chapter contends that Congress has traditionally responded to new threats by 
expanding the role of border security institutions.  Once these threats mature, Congress 
creates new institutions tasked with some aspect of border security while retaining 
established agencies, along with their border security missions.  This expansion leads to a 
diffuse set of border security goals, some of which are contradictory, and pushes the 
system into the trap of escalation.  Meadows explains that escalation comes from 
competing actors in a system trying to surpass each other, and if allowed to continue will 
drive the system to extremes—ending in the ultimate collapse of one of the actors.132  In 
the context of border security, escalation arises from separate agencies competing for 
funds and status, which will be detailed in Chapter IV.  Escalation also accounts for the 
creation of new agencies, as Congress responds to new problems by escalating the scope 
of border security institutions.  Moreover, the prolific increase in agencies tasked with 
performing border security missions prohibits the effective coordination and 
accomplishment of stated objectives; currently, there are fifteen separate federal agencies 
tasked with border security missions spread across three discrete federal departments.133  
Each of these agencies has its own unique history, culture, and bureaucratic agenda, 
obstructing the ability to establish any coherent overall border security goal. 
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A. HISTORY OF BORDER SECURITY 
1. Financing the Nation: Border Security at the Birth of the Nation 
The seeds of U.S. border security were sown on 4 July 1789 with the 2nd Act of 
Congress, which established a system of tariffs on imported goods.  At the conclusion of 
the Revolutionary War, the United States was highly in debt, and the country had to find 
a way to fund itself.  The threat of invasion from foreign powers was relatively minimal 
and the significance of borders, along with border security, became associated with 
collecting tariffs as a source of revenue.  The 3rd Act, passing on 20 July 1789, created 
additional tariffs to be placed on tonnage of ships entering the United States.  In order to 
enforce these tariffs, Congress’ 5th Act created 59 customs collection districts and official 
ports of entry in the 11 states that had ratified the Constitution.  The ports of entry were 
placed under the jurisdiction of a Collector of Customs, which became known as the U.S. 
Customs Service, establishing the first official border security institution in the United 
States and firmly cementing the connection between border security and revenue.134 
Congress quickly expanded the roles and responsibilities of the Collector of 
Customs to non-revenue activities with the passing of the 9th Act on 7 August 1789.  This 
act established the Lighthouse Service, under the Collector of Customs, to manage the 
existing 12 colonial lighthouses and oversee construction of new lighthouses for safety 
and navigation purposes within the United States.  The Collector of Customs was no 
longer tasked solely with the responsibility of gathering tariffs, but now the agency was 
in charge of managing lighthouses.  This increased the span of control of the Collector of 
Customs into the realm of commerce, signaling the beginning of the dilution of border 
security agency missions and the first step into the escalation trap.135 
On 2 September 1789, the Department of Treasury was created with the 11th Act 
of Congress.  The Secretary of Treasury was now responsible for the management of all 
matters pertaining to collection and protection of U.S. revenue, which up to this point in 
U.S. history was synonymous to border security.  The Department of Treasury managed 
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the revenue of the United States, which was obtained through the collection of custom 
tariffs by established border security agencies.  The U.S. Customs Service would remain 
under Treasury control until transferred to DHS in 2003.136 
2. Border Security’s Initial Maritime Focus 
In 1790, Congress authorized the construction of 10 Customs Revenue Cutters, 
Figure 5, and the establishment of the U.S. Revenue Marine to serve as crews.  The 
Revenue Marine was the only armed maritime service of the United States until the 
creation of the U.S. Navy in 1798.  Congress authorized the president to utilize the 
Marine for the nation’s defense in 1791, signaling the beginning of the Customs Service’s 
border defense role.  Furthermore, Congress ordered the design of a Customs Ensign, 
Figure 6, to be flown on all cutters to indicate the authority of the U.S. government—the 
first flag designed specifically for a federal government agency.137 
 
Figure 5.  USRC Massachusetts (From U.S. Coast Guard, http://www.uscg.mil) 





Figure 6.  U.S. Customs Ensign (From U.S. Coast Guard, http://www.uscg.mil) 
The responsibilities of border security institutions continued to expand in 1796 
when Congress tasked the Collectors of Customs to enforce quarantine and health laws, 
in addition to creating the Marine Hospital Service.  Congress established the Life Saving 
Service under the direction of the Revenue Marine in 1837, further enlarging the realm of 
the Collectors of Customs’ span of supervision and falling deeper into the escalation 
trap.138 
The continual expansion of roles placed under the direction of the Collectors of 
Customs finally led to the first major bureaucratic restructuring in 1871.  Congress 
combined the U.S. Revenue Marine, Life Saving Service, Steamboat Inspection Service, 
and Marine Hospital Service into one entity—Revenue Marine Division (RMD).  The 
management of RMD was removed from the Collectors of Customs and placed as a 
separate entity within the Department of Treasury.  RMD was later renamed the Revenue 
Cutter Service in 1894 and eventually became the U.S. Coast Guard on 28 January 
1915—contained within the Department of Treasury until transferred to DHS in 2003.139 
By the mid-1800s, the United States’ continual westward expansion was 
transforming the country from primarily a maritime power into a continental power.  This 
lead to a paradigm shift in border security; the U.S. Customs Border Patrol was 
established in 1853 when the Secretary of the Treasury authorized the Collectors of 




Customs to hire Customs Mounted Inspectors to patrol along U.S. land borders.140  The 
purposes of the Mounted Inspectors were to collect customs on goods entering the United 
States and deter the illegal smuggling of goods.  These goals would remain unchanged 
until the conclusion of the Civil War.141 
3. Border Security Responds to the Perceived Immigration Threat 
States began passing their own immigration laws after the Civil War; the Supreme 
Court ruled that enforcement of immigration laws was solely a federal responsibility in 
1875.  In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act attempting to cut off legal 
immigration from China and outlawed granting of citizenship to Chinese persons to 
protect the U.S. market from cheap labor.142  This forced migrants to attempt illegal entry 
into the United States.  In response to the new threat of illegal immigrants, Congress 
charged the Collectors of Customs and their Mounted Inspectors with enforcing the 
law—again succumbing to escalation by increasing the responsibilities of the Collectors 
of Customs.143 
The immigration issue led to the next series of bureaucratic restructurings.  The 
first restructuring took place when Congress established the Office of the Superintendent 
of Immigration under direct supervision of the Treasury Secretary with the Immigration 
Act of 1891.  This office was responsible for admitting, rejecting, and processing every 
immigrant seeking admission to the United States and implementing national 
immigration policy.  The superintendent hired immigrant inspectors, mainly consisting of 
former Customs and Chinese inspectors, to man immigration stations at official ports of 
entry into the United States.  In order to fund the Office, Congress passed the 
Immigration Act of 1882 containing a provision to collect a head tax of fifty cents on 
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every immigrant, which was placed into an “immigrant fund.”  Congress upgraded the 
Office of Immigration to the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) in 1895, still contained within 
Treasury.144   
Initially, the head tax collected by BOI placed the agency within Treasury; 
however, Congress’ primary interested in protecting American workers and wages made 
immigration a matter of commerce, leading to the next bureaucratic restructuring.  In 
1903, Congress transferred BOI into the Department of Commerce and Labor.  This 
department was split into two distinct entities, Department of Commerce and Department 
of Labor, in 1906 with BOI being placed in Labor.  The Department of Labor, in 1913, 
stripped BOI of some of its authority by creating the Bureau of Nationalization as a 
separate agency.  These agencies would remain distinct until 1933 when the two were 
merged into the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), remaining under the 
Department of Labor.145 
The concern over illegal immigration continued to grow during the early 
twentieth century.  Congress, in order to strengthen the enforcement of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, authorized the BOI to deploy Immigration Mounted Guards, along with 
Customs Mounted Inspectors, to patrol borders against illegal immigration and 
smuggling.  Out of an apprehension of a flood of immigrants fleeing war torn Europe, 
Congress tightened immigration policy in 1917.  The Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 
further constrict legal immigration into the United States.  The new restrictions to legal 
immigration caused a surge in illegal immigration attempts.  In 1924, Congress 
establishes the Immigration Service Border Patrol, which will become known as the U.S. 
Border Patrol, in the Department of Labor to stem the flow.  Descending border security 
further into the trap of escalation.146   
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4. Prohibition: The Beginning of Border Security as a Law Enforcement 
Tool 
Until this point in U.S. history, border agencies were primarily concerned with 
revenue and immigration; however, one event would thrust these agencies into the realm 
of law enforcement—Prohibition.  The Eighteenth Amendment took effect on 16 January 
1920, which prohibited the importation, transportation, and manufacturing or sale of 
alcoholic beverages.  This created a crisis along the border and the Immigration Services 
Border Patrol was quickly expanded to 450 officers to help enforce the new laws.  
Additionally, the Department of Treasury created an independent Bureau of Customs and 
the U.S. Customs Service Patrol used seized aircraft to provide aerial surveillance and 
enforcement—the first use of aerial reconnaissance along U.S. borders.147   
Confusion was rampant along the border during prohibition; five separate federal 
agencies were charged with protecting U.S. borders: Bureau of Customs, U.S. Customs 
Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration Services Border Patrol, and Bureau of Prohibition.  The 
Bureau of Prohibition in the Treasury Department was abolished in 1929 over confusion 
of overlapping enforcement responsibilities; however, another Bureau of Prohibition was 
created within the Department of Justice in 1930.148   
With the end of Prohibition, the Bureau of Prohibition was renamed the Alcohol 
Tax Unit (ATU) and placed back into the Department of Treasury.  ATU was later given 
the responsibility for enforcing federal tobacco laws and renamed the Alcohol and 
Tobacco Tax Division.  In 1968, the Gun Control Act gave the unit responsibility for 
administering regulatory provisions of the new law and was renamed Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms Division (ATF), still within Treasury.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
transferred the ATF and their law enforcement functions into the Department of Justice.  
The tax and trade functions of ATF, however, would remain within the Treasury 
Department with a new Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.149  
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Between 1920 to the end of Prohibition in 1933, twenty Customs Border Patrol, 4 
Immigration Service, and twenty-four Immigration Service Border Patrol officers were 
killed in the line of duty.  The failed experiment with Prohibition, however, thrust the 
transition of border security agencies from revenue collection entities into a law 
enforcement apparatus.150 
5. Immigration Threat Matures into National Security 
The end of Prohibition and with war brewing in Europe shifted the priority of 
border security back to immigration.  Additionally, the perception of immigration 
transformed; immigration was not only a matter of economics, but became a matter of 
national security indicated by more bureaucratic restructuring.  The Bureau of 
Immigration and Bureau of Naturalization were merged into the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) within the Department of Labor on 10 June 1933.  President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt then moved the INS into the Department of Justice in 1940, with 
the additional task of securing U.S. borders against enemy aliens during wartime.  INS’s 
workforce doubled to 8,000 employees during World War II, along with an increase of 
712 Border Patrol agents, to solidify control of U.S. borders against the entry of Axis 
saboteurs.151 
During this time, enforcement of immigration was paradoxically both increased 
and relaxed.  U.S. borders were tightened to prevent enemies entering, but at the same 
time relaxed to allow manual laborers from Mexico replace those entering military 
service with the Bracero Program.  The program began with a signed agreement between 
the United States and Mexico in 1942 and would continue to be in place until 1964.  
Mexican agricultural workers were allowed to sign temporary contracts to work in U.S. 
fields.  The program was later expanded to allow unskilled Mexican laborers work on 
U.S. railroads.  More than four million contracts would be signed over the history of the 
program.152  
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Public alarm that U.S. immigration policies were too lax and allowing criminal 
aliens, communists, and organized crime figures to live and work in the United States, 
however, forces the INS to again strengthen border controls in the mid-1950s.  
Additionally, the INS launches targeted investigation and deportation programs, most 
notably Operation Wetback targeting Mexicans in 1954.  The operation deported over 
one million illegal immigrants during its duration.153 
Following the end of World War II, border security’s focus shifts back to 
commerce.  In 1948, the Customs Patrol Service is abolished and Customs leads the 
creation of the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC) in 1952.  CCC is established to 
ensure the highest degree of harmony and uniformity in worldwide customs.  The council 
facilitates the growth of worldwide commerce and begins the era of globalization.154 
6. The Birth of Terrorism 
A new threat emerges in the early 1960s with an increase in aircraft hijackings—
terrorism.  Responding to this threat, President John F. Kennedy assigns U.S. Border 
Patrol agents to protect flights and prevent further hijackings on 10 August 1961.  The 
program is so successful that the operation is closed only two months later on 23 October 
1961 and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) peace officers assume responsibility.  
Hijacking, however, again becomes a concern in 1970 with a rash of hijackings of U.S. 
flag carriers.  Customs is tasked to establish a Sky Marshal program, which again is so 
successful it is closed in 1974.155 
7. Drugs: A New Role for Border Security 
As the hijacking threat waned, a new threat appears—drugs.  Drugs were 
introduced into American culture in the 1960s and began taking a toll on the nation.  
Resulting in significant bureaucratic changes to combat the new threat.  The Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was created within the Department of Justice in 
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1968, combining the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Narcotics and the Department of 
Health’s Bureau of Drug Abuse Control.  On 28 July 1973, President Richard Nixon 
created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the Department of Justice, which 
combined the BNDD and Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement “in order to create a 
single unified command to combat ‘an all-out global war on the drug menace.’”156 
Combating drugs would continue to be the dominant focus of U.S. border security 
policy throughout the 1980s.  President Ronald Reagan, in 1986, increased the anti-drug 
effort by signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.  This provided over $25 million to the 
Customs Service to update its equipment and establish intelligence centers throughout the 
United States.  Additionally, the focus on drugs led to increased bi-national cooperation 
with Mexico to stem the flow of drugs into the United States.157 
Commerce was pushed back to the forefront of border security policy in the 
1990s.  On 8 December 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
signed.  NAFTA reduced barriers to commerce and facilitated trade between Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States.  Furthermore, the CCC increased its membership and 
adopted the name of World Customs Organization, further increasing the ease of 
worldwide commerce.158 
8. 9/11: The Beginning of a New Era 
All this would change with the attacks of 9/11.  Border security was again viewed 
as a critical instrument of national security in the fight against terrorism.  9/11 ushered in 
an era of bureaucratic change not seen since World War II.  On 19 September 2001, U.S. 
Customs established the Terrorism Response Task Force to investigate leads regarding 
the 9/11 attacks.  Additionally, the Office For Anti-Terrorism was created in the Office of 
the Commissioner of Customs, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism was 
established to prevent legitimate commercial shipments from being used to smuggle 
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drugs and terrorism related materials, and the Port and Maritime Security Passage Act 
equipped Customs with tools, technology, and information needed to bolster the nation’s 
defenses against terrorism.  The Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002.  
Finally, on 1 March 2003, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was 
established within DHS, combining the Department of Justice’s INS and the Department 
of Treasury’s Customs Service.159 
The threat of terrorism continues to be the primary focus of border security; 
however, by 2007 commerce begins to reemerge.  That year CBP launched the National 
Agricultural Release Program to expedite the inspection and processing of high-volume, 
low-risk commodities.  Additionally, CBP deployed the Automated Commercial 
Environment, facilitating the processing of nearly 30,000 trucks a day.  In 2008, the 
Electronic System For Travel Authorization was started to allow nationals from Visa 
Waiver Program countries to receive electronic travel authorization before boarding U.S. 
bound planes or ships.160 
Border security institutions have continued to evolve throughout U.S. history, 
addressing the emerging threats facing the United States.  These threats include: the 
solvency of the U.S. government, immigration, drugs, and currently terrorism.  The 
previous threats remain, but priorities change.  The next section details the forces that 
have shaped and will continue to shape border security in the future.   
B. FORCES SHAPING BORDER SECURITY 
In the context of systems thinking, the forces shaping border security can be 
described as “stocks” and the evolution of border security policies and agencies become 
“feedback mechanisms” designed to regulate the stocks.  Meadows writes, “System 
thinkers see the world as a collection of stocks along with mechanisms for regulating the 
levels in the stocks by manipulating flows.”161  Through this lens, the border security 
patterns that emerge are a collection of feedback processes aimed at regulating stocks by 
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affecting flows.  Chapter IV will examine how border security has performed as a 
feedback mechanism regulating the system flows for each of the forces. 
1. Revenue 
No other force has shaped border security more than revenue throughout U.S. 
history. Securing a consistent form of revenue was so paramount that five of the first 11 
acts passed by Congress were revenue related.  Furthermore, every agency assigned to 
border security can trace its roots back to the Department of Treasury, Figure 7.  
Explained from a systems perspective, revenue can be viewed as a stock of funds, the 
accumulation of funds becomes the flow, and border security agency behavior is the 
feedback mechanism regulating the flow. 
 62 
 
Figure 7.  Border Security Institutions 
At the time, news media declared the Tariff Act of 4 July 1789 as “the second 
Declaration of Independence.”162  For nearly 125 years, customs revenue funded the 
entire U.S. government and paid for the nation’s early growth and infrastructure: 
territories of Louisiana, Oregon, Florida, and Alaska; National Road from Maryland to 
West Virginia; Transcontinental Railroad; lighthouses; U.S. military and naval 
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academies; and the city of Washington, DC.  By 1835, revenue from customs alone 
reduced the national debt to zero.  Customs continues to be a major source of revenue for 
the U.S. government, contributing over $32 billion annually.  Revenue has been the most 
consistent force affecting border security and will continue to shape institutions and goals 
in the future.163 
2. Commerce 
Commerce is closely related to revenue, but its influence has wavered throughout 
U.S. history.  Commerce’s role in shaping border security has shifted priorities from 
enforcing health and quarantine laws to facilitating worldwide trade.  In systems terms, 
the stock is international trade, the amount of trade becomes the flow, and trade policies 
are the feedback processes responding to changes in priorities.  In times of crisis, 
commerce’s role is surpassed by national security concerns and the feedback processes 
are tightened, reducing flows.  Commerce’s position was degraded during World War I 
and II and most recently after the attacks of 9/11; however, its importance grows during 
times of peace.164 
This cycle is apparent after World War II with the creation of the Customs Co-
operation Council, increasing the flow of trade.  Commerce continued to grow in 
standing during the 1990s with NAFTA and the expansion of CCC into the World 
Customs Organization.  The attacks of 9/11, however, relegated commerce once again.  
The significance of commerce, as a force, has since reemerged and continues to gain 
strength in recent years with the establishment of several CBP initiatives aimed at 
streamlining worldwide trade.  The global financial collapse and associated recovery 
efforts will cement the prominence of commerce in shaping the future of border 
security.165 
                                                 




3. National Security 
National security, when deemed necessary, is the strongest force shaping border 
security.  The stock for national security is the established defenses to threats, the flow is 
the amount of resources provided to defense agencies, and the feedback processes are the 
responses to perceived threats.  The first time border security institutions were employed 
as a national security instrument was the use of the U.S. Revenue Marine for protection 
of the nation before the Navy was founded.  After the Navy was established, national 
security concerns faded away from border security priorities.  In times of conflict, 
however, national security again becomes the dominant force behind border security, 
seen with the deployment of U.S. military assets along U.S. borders during the Mexican 
Revolution and both World Wars.  Yet national security anxieties quickly wither when 
hostilities end.166  
Trepidations over national security played little role in shaping border security 
following World War II.  The 9/11 Commission Report stated, “In the decade before 
September 11, 2001, border security…was not seen as a national security matter.”167  
The terrorist attacks propelled national security back to the forefront as the primary factor 
affecting the shape of border security, as border security’s role in the fight against 
terrorism became synonymous with national security.  As time goes on without further 
international terrorist attacks within the United States, national security’s preeminence is 
slowly eroding; nevertheless, national security will remain a powerful force in shaping 
border security.  
4. Immigration 
Immigration became a force molding border security in 1882 with the passage of 
the Chinese Exclusion Act and has remained a consistent influence ever since, albeit with 
changing priorities.  In a systems perspective, the stock for immigration is the number of 
immigrants in the United States, the flow is the number of people immigrating into the 
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United States, and the feedback processes are the immigration policies aimed to either 
increase or decrease the system’s stock.  Prior to World War II, the goal was to restrict 
migration into the United States, but during World War II it was used as a tool to recruit 
labor from Mexico.  The goal again returned to restricting migration following the war 
and has continued to gain importance with rise in concern over the influx of illegal 
migrant workers into the United States.  Immigration’s influence will continue to 
determine future border security considerations.168   
5. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement was not seen as a border security function until Prohibition—
ushering in a new era.  Prohibition transformed border security from a revenue collection 
and immigration entity into a major law enforcement apparatus.  Border security’s law 
enforcement function temporarily waned after Prohibition, but reasserted itself in the 
fight against drugs.  Law enforcement is the feedback mechanism designed to reduce the 
stock of drugs in the United States by cutting off the flow of illegal drugs into the 
country.  Prior to 9/11, the law enforcement function was the most powerful force 
shaping border security goals and institutions.  The force of law enforcement continues to 
strengthen as fretfulness swells over possible spillover violence from Mexico’s drug war 
and the fight against illegal drugs reestablishes itself as a priority. 
6. Terrorism 
Terrorism emerged as a component affecting border security in the 1960s with the 
rise in aircraft hijackings.  It remained a relevant element of border security until 1974 
when it nearly evaporated.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 forced terrorism back into the 
realm of border security, but under the province of national security where it remains 
today.  Terrorism, defined in either national security terms or as its own phenomenon, 
persists as the number one stated priority of U.S. border security institutions.  Put into 
systems vernacular, terrorism’s stock is the number of successful terrorist attacks, the 
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flow becomes terrorists planning or attempting attacks, and border security policies are 
the feedback processes intended to stop the flow.169 
C. EVOLVING GOALS AND PURPOSES OF BORDER SECURITY 
The first goal of border security was to ensure the solvency of the government, 
and its institutions were placed in the Department of Treasury.  Treasury would retain the 
institutions responsible for revenue and commerce until the creation of DHS.  When 
immigration appeared as a threat, it was initially placed within Treasury; however, as the 
threat matured into a risk to U.S. workers, the immigration function was placed into the 
Department of Labor.  Immigration transformed into a national security concern prior to 
World War II and in response was moved into the Department of Justice.170  
Similarly, Prohibition thrust border security institutions into the realm of law 
enforcement.  Initially, Customs was tasked with enforcing the new laws, but quickly 
new institutions were born within the Department of Justice.  The same scenario occurred 
with the rise of illegal drugs.  The Bureau of Narcotics, in Treasury, paved the way in 
drug enforcement until the threat matured, when it was absorbed into the BNDD within 
the Justice Department.171 
Terrorism, as well, was first responded to by expanding the role of Treasury.  The 
terrorist threat matured into the most prolific force shaping border security on 9/11, 
leading to significant bureaucratic restructuring and the creation of DHS.  CBP combined 
both Treasury and Justice border institutions into one agency with the primary goal of 
preventing another terrorist attack.  Terrorism continues to be the primary factor in border 
security today.172 






D. CURRENT GOAL OF BORDER SECURITY 
The goals of border security have been a balancing act of several competing 
forces—revenue, commerce, national security, immigration, law enforcement, and 
terrorism.  When faced with new threats, Congress responds by expanding the role of 
established border security institutions.  Once the threats mature, Congress succumbs to 
the trap of escalation by creating new institutions while retaining legacy agencies and 
their previous missions, as shown in the above discussion on the history of border 
security in the United States.  This trend has fueled confusion among border security 
entities, first becoming a significant problem during Prohibition, and prohibits the 
establishment of any coherent border security goal.  Rather than providing clear guidance 
to border security agencies, Congress instead expands the mission set of border security 
institutions.  This inhibits the ability to effectively synergize efforts to accomplish 
established goals, in addition to impeding the ability to measure system effectiveness. 
Currently, the preeminent stated border security goal is to protect the United 
States against terrorism, as seen in CBP’s mission statement: “We are the guardians of 
our Nation’s borders.  We are America’s frontline.  We safeguard the American 
homeland at and beyond our borders.  We protect the American public against terrorists 
and the instruments of terror.”173  Many of the agencies involved in border security, 
however, have different objectives.  These objectives range from stopping the flow of 
drugs and illegal immigrants into the United States to facilitating international commerce.  
Border security has morphed into a “catch all” institution used to address varying threats 
facing the United States.  As a result, there are fifteen separate federal agencies tasked 
with some border security role.  This thwarts the ability to establish any lucid overall 
border security goal.  
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Additionally, commerce is rematerializing as a foundational component to border 
security and is also included, albeit after terrorism, in CBP’s mission statement: “We 
steadfastly enforce the laws of the United States while fostering our Nation’s economic 
security through lawful international trade and travel.”174  The current trend of emergent 
border security policies aimed at facilitating international trade may be foreshadowing a 
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IV. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS 
This chapter examines the border security system’s effectiveness in achieving the 
objectives outlined in Chapter III through a systemic perspective.  It argues that the 
current system has succumbed to the following system traps introduced by Meadows: 
policy resistance, escalation, shifting the burden to the intervener, rule beating, and 
seeking the wrong goal.175  Additionally, it is argued that the mechanistic bureaucratic 
system in place is ineffective at confronting the complexity and complex adaptive 
systems present along the border.  
The chapter first introduces the concept of system traps and discusses the 
structural factors limiting the effectiveness of border security.  This is followed by a 
study of border security institutions’ effectiveness, acting as feedback mechanisms, 
regulating system flows for each of the forces explained in Chapter III.  Finally, the cost 
of the present system is reviewed.  Chapter V projects a new border security paradigm, 
which, if implemented, will address current limitations and increase North American 
security. 
A. SYSTEM TRAPS 
Problems arise when systems are structured to address perceived linear problems 
that are actually nonlinear and complex, as is the case in the border security environment.  
Meadows writes, “The world is nonlinear.  Trying to make it linear for our mathematical 
or administrative convenience is not usually a good idea even when feasible, and it is 
rarely feasible.”176  She uses the term “traps” to describe these problems.  Below is a 
discussion of the system traps the border security system has fallen into. 
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1. Policy Resistance 
Policy resistance stems from the bounded rationalities of system actors and is 
prevalent in systems whose actors have differing, mutually exclusive goals.  Meadows 
explains policy resistance the following way: 
When various actors try to pull a system stock toward various goals, the 
result can be policy resistance.  Any new policy, especially if it’s 
effective, just pulls the stock farther from the goals of other actors and 
produces additional resistance, with a result that no one likes, but that 
everyone expends considerable effort in maintaining.177 
Policy resistance is key in understanding DTO innovations in smuggling tactics as 
a response to the intensification of border security agency activities along the border.  
Also, this trap is the primary reason why efforts to stop the flow of drugs and illegal 
immigrants at the border are futile.  
2. Escalation 
Escalation occurs when competing system actors establish a reinforcing feedback 
loop trying to get ahead of one another.  This trap is not necessarily bad if the 
competition is towards achieving a desirable goal; however, escalation can become an 
insidious trap leading to a self-reinforcing arms race when goals are not aligned.  In the 
context of border security, escalation presents itself in the continual competition for funds 
and prestige among the various border security agencies.  Escalation, in part, explains 
why agencies are hesitant to work with one another and share information.178 
3. Shifting the Burden to the Intervener 
Shifting the burden to the intervener occurs when a system actor performs an 
action that temporarily reduces a problem’s symptoms, but nothing is done to address the 
problem’s root cause.  After a while, the original problem reappears and the intervener is 
required to apply more of the “solution.”  This results in a system that becomes 
dependent on the intervener.  Meadows describes this trap: 
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Shifting the burden, dependence, and addiction arise when a solution to a 
systemic problem reduces (or disguises) the symptoms, but does nothing 
to solve the underlying problem.  Whether it is a substance that dulls one’s 
perception or a policy that hides the underlying trouble, the drug of choice 
interferes with the actions that could solve the real problem.  If the 
intervention designed to correct the problem causes the self-maintaining 
capacity of the original system to atrophy or erode, then a destructive 
reinforcing feedback loop is set in motion.  The system deteriorates; more 
and more of the solution is then required.  The system will become more 
and more dependent on the intervention and less and less able to maintain 
its own desired state.179   
The trap of shifting the burden is widely prevalent in the realm of border security.  
The United States has shifted the burden of immigration, drugs, and terrorism to border 
security agencies, without adequately addressing the root causes of the problems.  This 
has manifested itself into such policies as expanding the amount of border fence and 
explains the exponential growth of border security agencies—the USBP alone has seen a 
518 percent increase in manpower since the 1990s.180 
4. Rule Beating 
Rule beating ensues when system actors behave in a way that looks like they are 
obeying the rules, yet in actuality are distorting the system’s goals.  This trap normally 
occurs at lower levels in a hierarchy and is synonymous, in the context of border security, 
to corruption.181  Corruption has plagued Mexican institutions for years, but has recently 
become an increasing concern for U.S. agencies.  David Aguilar, acting CBP 
commissioner, testified before Congress stating: 
Since October 1, 2004, 141 CBP employees have been arrested or indicted 
for acts of corruption.  Of the 141 arrests, 102 are considered mission 
compromising acts of corruption, which means the employee’s illegal 
activities were for personal gain and violated, or facilitated the violation 
of, the laws CBP personnel are charged with enforcing.  Examples of 
mission compromising corruption include such offenses as alien 
                                                 
179 Ibid., 135. 
180 Eric L. Olson and Erik Lee, “The State of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” Border 
Research Partnership, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, August 2012, 
3. 
181 Meadows, Thinking is Systems, 136–37. 
 72 
smuggling, allowing loads of narcotics through a port of entry or 
checkpoint, providing sensitive information to drug trafficking 
organizations, selling immigration documents, or circumventing CBP’s 
detection systems.182  
5. Seeking the Wrong Goal 
Seeking the wrong goal arises when goals are poorly defined and are measured 
with the wrong metrics.  Meadows explains: 
System behavior is particularly sensitive to the goals of feedback loops.  If 
the goals—the indicators of satisfaction of the rules—are defined 
inaccurately or incompletely, the system may obediently work to produce 
a result that is not really intended or wanted.183 
The trap reveals itself in border security when effort is confused with results, as is 
the case in the goal of stopping terrorism.  The desired state of the system, concerning 
terrorism, is to prevent attacks and is primarily measured by the amount of money spent.  
This leads to a system that produces spending on border security, but in actuality does 
little to prevent terrorist attacks. 
B. STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
The bureaucratic and political structure in place limits the effectiveness of border 
security, along with treating northern and southern borders as distinct entities.  
Traditional mechanistic bureaucratic agencies cannot complete with the highly adaptive 
organizations they face, as discussed in the literature review.  Furthermore, the political 
system, which agencies must operate in, fosters competition between agencies and among 
political actors themselves.  The subunit agendas add up to an overall system behavior 
that is not intended.  Meadows explains, “The bounded rationality of each actor in a 
system—determined by the information, incentives, goals, and constraints—may not lead  
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to decisions that further the welfare of the system as a whole.”184  This section discusses 
the bureaucratic, political, and border policy discrepancy impacts on system 
effectiveness. 
1. Bureaucratic Limitations 
The border security system has been highly criticized for its lack of coordination, 
collaboration, and information sharing.  The literature review cited just a few of the 
examples present in the literature.  These problems stem from having no less than 15 
separate agencies involved in border security.  All agencies must compete to secure 
funding and continuously fight for prestige—pushing the system into the escalation trap.  
ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious is a prime example of the pervious effects escalation 
can have on a system.  John Malcolm writes: 
The FBI and DEA command respect within the law enforcement 
community, ATF agents often do not.  The DEA and the FBI are charged 
with going after the leaders of drug cartels…while ATF is supposed to 
keep guns out of the hands of bad guys.  At its heart, Operation Fast and 
Furious appears to have been an attempt by certain individuals within 
ATF, supported by senior DOJ officials, to play with the “big boys” by 
targeting kingpins within the Sinaloa drug cartel.  In doing so, however, 
ATF abandoned its most basic mission.185  
Escalation also explains the pursuing attempt by ATF to cover up its actions.  
Two days after the death of USBP Agent Brain Terry, an ATF supervisor wrote to 
another agent: “Maybe Phoenix should start preparing their explanation for the way that 
they conducted their straw purchases there.  They should probably hire a media expert 
anyway to assist them in explaining the 2000 firearms and the possible connection in the 
murder of a Border Patrol Agent.”186 
In addition to escalation, having 15 agencies involved in border security presents 
structural and cultural problems impeding interagency coordination.  Rumu Sarkar, 
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addressing the structural problem, writes, “This stove-piping of roles, functions, legal 
authorities, funding, and Congressional oversight obviously creates problems in 
achieving a unity of effort.”187  The Goldwater-Nichols legislation forced the armed 
services to improve interagency cooperation; yet no similar legislation has compelled the 
fusion of border security agencies.188 
Each agency has its own culture, reflected in their distinct roles, functions, and 
history, which act as an additional barrier to coordination.  There is no shared language, 
doctrine, techniques, or procedures between agencies.  Furthermore, none of the agencies 
have institutional cultures of learning or a system of professional education, making 
sharing lessons learned between agencies nearly impossible.  Sarkar writes, “Unlike the 
military, civilians have no doctrine; no accepted tactics, techniques and procedures; and 
no clear chain of command, so lessons learned are much more difficult to nest 
institutionally.”189 
2. Political Limitations 
The largest impediment to effective border security is the political system, which 
establishes the border security system’s structure, defines its goals, and performs 
oversight of the entire system.  The primary reason the political system limits border 
security effectiveness is because the border security system is a result of the political 
process.  Treverton writes:  
Public-sector organizational design is a political process of competition 
among interest groups.  American public bureaucracy is not designed to be 
effective.  The bureaucracy arises out of politics, and its design reflects the 
interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political 
power.190 
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There are four problems embedded within the U.S. political process limiting the 
effectiveness of border security institutions.  First, major legislation normally “contains 
provisions designed to address a particular problem along with provisions that limit the 
efficacy of those solutions in the form of exceptions, exemptions, limitations, and 
cumbersome procedures.”191  This results in legislation that approaches incoherence.192 
The second problem is the distributive tendency and goal distortion that occurs as 
legislators attempt to pass a bill.  To gain the support needed, legislators need to 
distribute the associated funds more widely than the problem dictates, leading to goal 
distortion.  Dara Cohen et al. write, “Distributing the funds from a program more 
widely…breaks the link between the legislative solution and the problem the program is 
designed to address.  Programs regularly distribute funds widely in a way that distorts 
their purpose.”193 
The third problem is multiple veto points during the legislative process.  At least 
two committees share jurisdiction on any issue, one in each the House and Senate—along 
with numerous other committees and subcommittees with overlapping jurisdictions.  All 
have veto power over proposed legislation, which results in compromises that affect the 
goals of the legislation and the means used to address the goals.194 
The final problem is overlapping congressional oversight jurisdiction.  The 
committees and subcommittees charged with oversight ensure policy implementation, but 
they also push the direction of policy to pursue their own interests.  Cohen et al. explain 
this problem: 
Because members on the different subcommittees have different interests, 
they pull policymaking within their domain in different directions.  For 
policies that are completely independent, this is fine, but when the policies 
interact…the inconsistent views on different subcommittees can create 
potential problems.  Consider a set of bureaus that work on related policies 
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but were created by different legislation and are overseen by different 
subcommittees or committees.  They are likely to pursue different goals, 
in part because the legislation creating them differs and in part because the 
interests of the members of the relevant subcommittees differ.195 
This exact problem is widely prevalent in the realm of border security.  The 
overlapping jurisdictions of committees overseeing aspects of border security and 
decentralized congressional control preserve the non-coordination status quo and sustain 
the persisting fragmentation that exists in the border security system. 
The net result of the above problems is border security legislation that is not 
designed to succeed in achieving its stated goals.  Cohen et al. conclude, “Political 
competition thus routinely distorts the goals of the legislation.  Legislation rarely 
addresses policy problems directly.  Indeed, sometimes it is designed to fail.”196  
3. Northern and Southern Border Discrepancy 
The United States has distinct policies and strategies concerning its northern and 
southern borders.  The northern border is over 4,000 miles long, touching 12 states, and 
consists of mountains, rivers, lakes, and prairies.  The northern border experiences heavy 
snow and bitter cold temperatures in the winter.  In contrast, the southern border consists 
of vast deserts and the Rio Grande, with temperatures exceeding 100 degrees for much of 
the year.  The southern border stretches 2,000 miles across four states.197  
USBP deploys a varying mix of personnel and resources along the two borders.  
The primary goal of the Southwest border is to deter illegal immigration.  Since 2000, 
98.7 percent of alien apprehensions were made along the Southwest border, and 
85 percent of USBP manpower is deployed along the Mexican border.  This represents  
 
 
the “Prevention Through Deterrence” operational strategy, in place since the 1990s.  The 
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goal of this strategy is to reroute illegal border traffic from urban areas to less populated, 
geographically harsher areas.198 
The northern border strategy focuses on preventing the entry of terrorists and 
reducing cross-border crime and smuggling, while facilitating commerce.  To achieve 
this goal, USBP works closely with Canadian authorities, through established IBETs, to 
identify threat areas and uses enhanced intelligence-gathering technologies to monitor 
cross-border activity.  Additionally, Free and Secure Trade (FAST) lanes have been 
created to speed legitimate commerce across the border.199 
The disparity between the borders is apparent in the willingness to engage with 
Canadian authorities, while maintaining anemic U.S.-Mexican cooperation.  Treating the 
borders as separate entities prevents the establishment of any coherent border security 
goal.  This creates confusion among border security agencies; moreover, instilling 
disparate goals into a system ultimately sets the system up for failure.  
C. SYSTEM FLOWS 
This section examines the effectiveness of border security agencies regulating 
system flows for each of the forces introduced in Chapter III.  Additionally, system traps 
the border security system has succumbed to are identified for each of the forces.  
1. Revenue and Commerce 
Revenue and commerce are closely related and addressed simultaneously.  The 
system flow for revenue and commerce is the amount of revenue produced through 
international commerce.  When system goals allow, border security agencies have had 
great success in generating revenue—funding the entire nation for over a century.  
Recently, however, this force has fallen into the trap of seeking the wrong goal at great 
expense to the North American economy.   
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The United States and Canada have the world’s largest bilateral trading 
relationship, consisting of almost $500 billion per year.  Prior to 9/11, the border was 
regarded as the longest unguarded border in the world—a source of pride for both 
countries.  Increased border requirements introduced by the United States after 9/11 
significantly reduced Canadian exports, some figures show as much as 10 percent, and 
have cost the United States over $10 billion annually.  The United States implemented 
increased restrictions citing security concerns, yet Peter Andreas contends while these 
measures may calm the public, they inhibit trade and travel more than prevent terrorist 
activities—clearly an example of the effects of seeking the wrong goal.200 
2. National Security 
As in the case for revenue and commerce, the border security system has fallen 
into the trap of seeking the wrong goal concerning national security.  National security 
has no definable metrics that can be used by the border security system to measure 
success.  Moreover, national security is not a task the border security system is designed 
to accomplish.  The military is the institution created specifically for national security; 
when national security concerns include protection of U.S. borders, as during both World 
Wars, military assets are deployed, rather than border security agencies. 
3. Immigration 
Immigration has tumbled into the system traps of policy resistance, shifting the 
burden to the intervener, and rule beating.  Border security attempts to prohibit illegal 
immigration have rarely worked.  The Chinese Exclusion Act did not prevent Chinese 
from immigrating to the United States and today, according to Foreign Affairs, 90 to 
98 percent of those who attempt to cross illegally are ultimately successful.  Furthermore, 
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apprehension rates continue to fall and are currently at their lowest point since 1970.  The 
following system traps, along with economic factors, explain this lack of effectiveness.201   
The policy resistance trap is the primary reason efforts to stop illegal immigration 
fail.  Policy resistance arises from the increased presence of both technology and 
manpower patrolling U.S. borders, forcing smugglers to become increasingly innovative.  
Charles Edwards, acting DHS Inspector General, testified, “Smuggling of drugs and 
people into the U.S. has generated tens of billions of dollars for the smugglers.  As efforts 
to secure the border meet with increasing success…the smugglers have been forced to 
become more creative and clever in their illicit activities.”202  This cycle of increased 
technology being responded to by innovation will continue with smugglers always having 
the upper hand.  
Immigration has also descended into the trap of shifting burden.  Rather than 
addressing the root cause of illegal immigration, the United States has used the border 
security system as the solution that only temporarily reduces the symptoms.  This is 
evident in the “Prevention Through Deterrence” strategy, which temporary reduces 
illegal immigration in one area—only to reappear in another.  This phenomenon is the 
“balloon” effect: pressure applied in one area pushes the air into another area of less 
resistance, but does not reduce the amount of air.  The balloon effect is apparent in a CRS 
report that states, “Increasing enforcement along the Arizona border has begun to shift 
the pattern of unauthorized migration back to California.”203  
The final trap, rule beating, has further decreased the effectiveness in regulating 
illegal immigration’s flow.  Smugglers, as reported by David Aguilar, have corrupted  
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increasing numbers of border security employees.  Leading to the passage of the Anti-
Border Corruption Act of 2010, requiring all CBP applicants to pass a polygraph test 
before being hired.204 
4. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement is the feedback mechanism designed to reduce the stock of 
drugs in the United States by cutting the flow of illegal drugs into the country.  The 
system traps law enforcement has sunk into mirror those of immigration: policy 
resistance, shifting the burden, and rule beating.  Border security has never successfully 
been able to stop the flow of illegal products into the country, as proved during 
Prohibition. 
Policy resistance is again the primary reason stopping the flow of drugs has failed.  
Meadows directly uses the analogy of drugs to explain policy resistance: 
If any one actor gains an advantage and moves the system stock (drug 
supply) in one direction (enforcement agencies manage to cut drug 
imports at the border), the others double their efforts to pull it back (street 
prices go up, addicts have to commit more crimes to buy their daily fixes, 
higher prices bring more profits, suppliers use the profits to buy planes 
and boats to evade border patrols).  Together, the countermoves produce a 
standoff, the stock is not much different from before, and that is not what 
anybody wants.205 
The cycle of increased enforcement being overcome by DTO innovations are 
collaborated in the congressional testimonies of Charles Edwards, James Dinkins, and 
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Donna Bucella.206  Further proof that mechanistic bureaucracies are not able to compete 
with the complex adaptive systems operating along borders.  
The United States has traditionally shifted the burden of its drug problem to the 
border security system, avoiding the problem’s root cause—consumption.  This first 
became evident when President Nixon declared a “war on drugs” in the 1970s.  Efforts to 
stop the flow of drugs into the United States resulted in the initiation of the balloon 
effect.  Beau Kilmar et al. explain, “Until the 1990s, most cocaine shipped from 
Colombia entered the United States through the Caribbean.  However, after increased 
enforcement pressure in that region, cocaine traffickers began hiring Mexican smugglers 
to get cocaine into the United States.  Over time, the Mexican DTOs played a bigger role 
in the cocaine trade, and this generated enormous revenues.”207  Furthermore, shifting the 
burden to reduce the supply of drugs has little effect on consumption.  Kilmar et al. write, 
“Enforcement against suppliers is not a very effective way to reduce the use of drugs that 
are supplied through well-established markets; interventions in source countries appear to 
be particularly futile in this regard.”208  
Rule beating, as with immigration, has further decreased the effectiveness of 
regulating the drug flow into the United States.  This trap, in the form of corruption, will 
continue to plague border security’s effectiveness as DTO influence continues to 
strengthen.  Together the three system traps result in a consistent stock of available drugs 
in the United States, and no technological or institutional advancements aimed at supply 
reduction will likely have any sustained effect on the system. 
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5. Terrorism 
The tragedy of 9/11 thrust the border security system into the trap of seeking the 
wrong goal.  Following the attacks, U.S. borders were drawn into the realm of national 
security.  In response, DHS was created representing the largest federal government 
realignment since World War II.  Additionally, CBP was formed with stopping terrorism 
as its first priority.  This reaction was a political necessity to ease American’s fears.  Yet 
none of the 9/11 terrorists crossed either border illegally, rather they entered legally on 
student or immigrant visas.209 
Terrorism, as with national security, does not have any definitive metrics that 
border security agencies can measure success.  Terrorism is a potential threat and not a 
realized threat.  Only one terrorist has been detained attempting to cross the border, 
occurring in 1999 before the emphasis on terrorism.  Furthermore, the terrorist was 
apprehended while attempting a legal crossing.  There has never been a confirmed case of 
any terrorist trying to cross either border illegally.  Despite terrorism concerns, numerous 
U.S. governmental agencies have proclaimed “no significant threat to the United States 
has materialized in Mexico nor penetrated the U.S.-Mexico border since 2001.”210  The 
same statement can describe the terrorist threat along the U.S.-Canadian border.  The 
consequences of seeking the wrong goal are precious resources being diverted away from 
more productive endeavors and a huge reduction in international trade.211   
D. COSTS 
The GAO reports that the United States spends close to $12 billion a year on 
border security, yet DHS estimates achieving operational control of only 13 percent of 
U.S. borders—50 percent of the U.S.-Mexican and three percent of the U.S.-Canadian.  
Of that 13 percent, only 12 percent are classified as “controlled,” the highest level for 
detection and interdiction at the border.  The remaining 88 percent are classified as 
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“managed,” meaning interdictions may be achieved after illegal entry by multi-tiered 
operations.212 
The above border security cost estimate does not include the amount spent on 
drug efforts.  ONDCP requested a budget of $26.2 billion for fiscal year 2012—$15.5 
billion targeted to supply reduction and the remaining $10.7 billion towards demand.  
Only the amount spent on supply reduction is included in total system cost.213 
In addition to the direct expenditures on border security and drug supply 
reduction, the loss to revenue and commerce has to be included into any calculation.  
Deborah Meyers estimates that the reduction in trade with Canada alone costs the United 
States $10 billion annually.  Reports on the economic impacts to U.S.-Mexican trade are 
inconclusive, therefore not included.  This puts the total price to over $37.5 billion a year, 
represented in Table 1, for a system that is marginally effective, at best.214 
 
Border Security  $12 billion 
Supply Reduction  $15.5 billion 
Reduction in Trade $10 billion 
Total System Cost $37.5 billion 
 
Table 1.   Border security system cost  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter argued that the current border security system has succumbed to 
numerous system traps: policy resistance, escalation, shifting the burden, rule beating, 
and seeking the wrong goal.  It also introduced the structural limitations of the present 
system.  The effects of these traps and structural limitations on the border security 
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regime’s ability to regulate system flows was explained through a systemic perspective 
for each of the forces identified in Chapter III.  Chapter V projects a new paradigm that 





V. NEW BORDER SECURITY PARADIGM 
The border security system operates in an environment containing highly complex 
adaptive systems.  Chapter IV detailed the ineffectiveness of the current system in 
confronting these systems, along with addressing the wicked problems it faces.  This 
chapter projects a new border security paradigm, which, if implemented, will increase 
North American security. 
According to Meadows, “Paradigms are the sources of systems.  From them, from 
shared social agreements about the nature of reality, come system goals and information 
flows, feedbacks, stocks, flows, and everything else about systems.”215  Changing a 
system’s paradigm is the second highest leverage point offered by Meadows and if 
changed will transform the entire border security apparatus.  The previous chapters 
examined the current border security system in order to discover the system’s lever 
points, what Holland describes as “points where a simple intervention causes a lasting, 
directed effect.”216  It is apparent, from this examination, that the most effective leverage 
point present in the border security system is to change its paradigm. 
The border security paradigm, or mindset, needs to change from stopping 
terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug interdiction to jointly facilitating the efficient 
flow of lawful trade, travel, and immigration between North American countries.  
Accompanying this new paradigm, two significant policy changes are warranted: 
legalization of drugs and reinstatement of a Bracero type program.  This new paradigm, 
along with the policy changes, will enable the border security system to overcome system 
traps by changing the current rules, structures, and goals of the entire system. 
This chapter explains how the new paradigm, using Meadows’ leverage points, 
will surmount the system traps the border security system has succumbed and projects a 
new structure to increase effectiveness.  The forces affecting border security are 
examined through the lens of the new paradigm, and a new tri-national border security 
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agency, based on collaboration, is introduced.  Finally, the cost of the new system is 
addressed.  Chapter VI will discuss implementation barriers, how to overcome these 
barriers, and feasibility of the establishment of the new system.217 
A. SYSTEM TRAPS 
Border security has fallen into the traps of: policy resistance, escalation, shifting 
the burden to the intervener, rule beating, and seeking the wrong goal.  Changing the 
system’s paradigm engages several of Meadows’ leverage points simultaneously.  This 
section describes the specific leverage points, unleashed on the system by introducing a 
paradigm shift, that will allow border security to overcome each of the above traps.218 
1. Policy Resistance 
The lack of success in stemming the flow of illegal immigration and drugs across 
North American borders is directly attributed to policy resistance.  Increased barriers and 
control measures put in place along the border leads to greater DTO innovation, resulting 
in no significant change to the system’s stocks.  Changing the system’s paradigm, 
however, alters the rules of the system—another leverage point—transforming the 
system’s incentives, punishments, and constraints.  The new rules, namely the 
legalization of drugs and reinstatement of a Bracero type program, will allow the system 
to break out of the policy resistance trap.219 
2. Escalation 
Escalation accounts for the lack of cooperation between border security agencies.  
In order to overcome this trap, the border security system’s structure must be changed.  
Changing system structure is the fourth highest leverage point offered by Meadows, and 
transforming the system’s paradigm entails changing its structure.  The new structure is 
described in the next section.220  
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3. Shifting the Burden to the Intervener 
Border security agencies have been charged with combating the symptoms of 
drug use and illegal immigration, yet little has been done to address the root causes of the 
problems.  Changing the system paradigm will directly confront the root causes of the 
problems, allowing border security to overcome this system trap.221 
4. Rule Beating 
Rule beating, in the form of corruption, is plaguing border security institutions.  
The leverage point enabling border security to defeat this trap is altering system structure.  
Revolutionizing the paradigm encompasses system structural transformation; rule beating 
is specifically addressed in the discussion on revenue and commerce forces. 
5. Seeking the Wrong Goal 
Border security’s goals are poorly defined and measured with the wrong metrics.  
Implementing a new system paradigm changes the goals of the system—the third highest 
leverage point.  A new, clearly defined, system goal is introduced in the discussion of 
forces affecting border security.222  
B. STRUCTURAL RECOMMENDATIONS  
Chapter IV detailed the reasons why the current bureaucratic and political 
structure hampers border security effectiveness, along with treating northern and southern 
borders as distinct entities.  This section addresses the shortcomings of the current system 
by applying Meadows’ leverage point of changing system structure to project a new 
border security arrangement.  Combined with new system goals and rules introduced by a 
fresh paradigm, these structural changes will increase North American security.  
1. Bureaucratic Recommendation 
The U.S. border security system contains 15 distinct agencies, contained within 
three separate departments, competing against each other to secure funding and prestige.  
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Additionally, there are no less than 10 official interconnection agencies designed to 
increase coordination between agencies.  This structure creates problems in achieving any 
kind of unity of effort.  To correct this obvious flaw, one agency solely responsible for 
border security is needed.   
Establishing one agency will push the border security system out of the escalation 
trap.  Moreover, a single agency will be able to institute shared language, culture, 
doctrine, techniques, and procedures that enables lessons learned to be quickly nested 
institutionally.  Rather than a traditional mechanistic structure, the new agency should be 
based on an adhocracy structure.  Contingency theory, outlined in the literature review, 
requires the creation of an adhocracy to adequately address the complexities of the border 
security environment.   
Furthermore, the new agency should base its strategy formulation on Mintzberg’s 
learning school, as described in the literature review.  Mintzberg et al. write: 
Some organizations face perpetual novelty.  In other words, their 
environments are dynamic and unpredictable, which makes it difficult to 
converge on a clear strategy at all.  In this case, the structure tends to take 
the form of adhocracy, or project organization, and the learning approach 
becomes almost mandatory—the means to work things out in a flexible 
manner.  At the very least, it allows the organization to do something—to 
respond to an evolving reality in individual steps instead of having to wait 
for a fully determined strategy.223 
This dynamic and unpredictable atmosphere describes the border security 
environment. 
Finally, the new agency should be moved out of DHS and into the Department of 
Commerce.  This change is necessary to align the new agency with the paradigm shift of 
jointly facilitating the efficient flow of lawful trade, travel, and immigration between 
North American countries.  
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2. Political Recommendation 
The greatest impediment to border security is the political system itself.  The 
border security system relies on the political system to define its structure, goals, and to 
perform oversight.  Chapter IV detailed four problems embedded within the U.S. political 
process.  While two major problems, legislation containing provisions and distributive 
tendency, cannot be changed without transforming the entire U.S. political system, 
creating one joint oversight committee can address the other two, multiple veto points 
and overlapping jurisdiction. 
The new agency needs to fall under the jurisdiction of one joint congressional 
committee.  This will reduce the number of veto points during the legislative process, 
limiting the amount of compromises affecting the goals and means to address problems.  
Furthermore, having centralized congressional control enables the creation of coherent, 
consistent system goals. 
3. One Continent, One Agency 
Currently, the United States has separate policies for each of its borders, which 
adversely affects the ability to secure either border.  The United States works closely with 
Canadian authorities, while maintaining a defensive posture along the Southwest border.  
A tri-national border security agency is needed in order to increase North American 
security.  The paradigm shift of jointly facilitating the efficient flow of lawful trade, 
travel, and immigration between North American countries necessitates the establishment 
of a tri-national agency, which will synchronize commerce policies between North 
American countries—increasing the efficiency of trade, travel, and immigration. 
The agency’s strategy formulation should be based on collaborative planning, 
outlined in the literature review.  Collaborative planning will overcome barriers by 
establishing common goals, recognizing interdependence, formalizing relationships, and 
creating lateral mechanisms.  Furthermore, applying the Cynefin framework to the 
complex nature of the border security environment leads to the establishment of 
collaborative planning.  Doing so enables all three countries to move beyond merely 
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sharing information to jointly creating information.  Figures 8, 9, and 10 illustrate the 
evolution of the current system structure to the one envisioned.224   
 
Figure 8.  Current border security system 
Figure 9 represents the effect on the system by legalizing drugs.  This greatly 
simplifies the system’s shape by removing DTOs, gangs, and drug users.  The agencies 
specifically created for drug enforcement—DEA and NDIC—or perform drug related 
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activities—FBI, Department of Treasury, Bank of Mexico, and Mexico’s Finance and 
Credit—are also removed, along with the established drug coordination agencies: SIU, 
HIDTA, OCDETF, and ONDCP.  Finally, agencies not directly involved in border 
activities are removed: CSIS, PF, PFM, and Mexican military. 
 
Figure 9.  Border security system after the legalization of drugs 
This results in a system still containing eight U.S. agencies—DHS, OFO, USBP, 
CBP, USCG, ICE, DOJ, and ATF—two Canadian agencies—RCMP and CBSA—and  
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one Mexican agency—SSP.  Additionally, five border security coordination agencies 
remain—ACTT, SWB Initiative, EPIC, IBET, and BEST—of which only two, IBET and 
BEST, contain international members. 
Figure 10 represents the envisioned system transformation with the establishment 
of a tri-national border security agency.  Forming a single U.S. border security agency 
under the Department of Commerce, alone, replaces five U.S. agencies: OFO, USBP, 
CBP, ICE, and ATF.  DHS, USCG, and DOJ are left outside the system and allowed to 
perform their respective missions without having to divert manpower to accomplish 
border security tasks.  Furthermore, the internal coordination agencies—ACTT, SWB 
Initiative, and EPIC—become completely redundant and can be eliminated.  Finally, the 
tri-national border security agency consolidates IBET and BEST coordination agencies 
into a single entity.  The end result is a border security apparatus containing one U.S. 
agency, one Mexican agency, and two Canadian agencies whose efforts are coordinated 
through a single institution.  This simplified system is vastly superior to the current, 
almost incomprehensible, border security regime. 
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Figure 10.  Border security system after establishment of tri-national agency 
C. EFFECTS ON SYSTEM FLOWS 
This section describes the effects of implementing the new paradigm, policies, 
and structure on the forces shaping border security.  Chapter IV examined the border 
security system’s ineffectiveness in regulating system flows by identifying the system 
traps each of the forces has succumbed.  The border security system’s new goal is clear: 
jointly facilitate the efficient flow of lawful trade, travel, and immigration between North 
American countries.  Each force is re-examined through the lens of this new paradigm 
and associated innovative drug and immigration policies, specifying how system traps 
will be overcome.   
 94 
1. Revenue and Commerce 
Revenue and commerce have fallen into the trap of seeking the wrong goal.  The 
new paradigm changes the system’s goal to facilitating the efficient flow of lawful trade 
between North American countries, allowing the system to surmount this system trap.  
The new goal signals a change back to the root function of border security, which 
successfully funded the United States for over a century.  Increasing the efficiency of 
trade between North American countries simultaneously strengthens the economy and 
security of each nation, in addition to North American security.   
The creation of a tri-national border security agency entails creating joint border 
stations, replacing the existing unilateral approach.  Establishing joint border stations is 
not only more cost-efficient, but also increases effectiveness.  According to Michel 
Zarnowiecki, “juxtaposed facilities allow economies of scale, better cooperation, 
simplified formalities, improved control over fraud, and informal data and intelligence 
exchanges.”225  Furthermore, Deborah Meyers contends that the United States needs to 
shift to a multilateral approach from its current unilateral one in order to increase 
intelligence, which she believes is the key to successful border management.226   
Creating joint border stations also overcomes the system trap of rule beating.  
Working side-by-side, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officers will be less prone to 
exploitation and corruption given they are constantly observing each other.  This will not 
completely solve the problem of corruption; however, it does make rule beating much 
more difficult.  
Finally, joint borders demonstrate friendship and solidarity between the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico—strengthening the fragility of Mexico’s institutions and, in 
turn, North American security.  Zarnowiecki believes the political effect of joint borders  
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can matter more than the operations, and Meyers asserts, “only an intelligent, common 
approach will help us reach the point where we have a safer continent and mature borders 
among true and equal partners.”227 
2. National Security 
Seeking the wrong goal is the trap the border security system has plunged into 
concerning national security.  In the context of the new paradigm, national security 
concerns are left to those institutions created specifically for national security—the 
military, including the Coast Guard.  The previous chapters have shown that during 
periods when borders become a national security concern the military is called on to 
secure U.S. borders.   
Following 9/11, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established to 
protect the national security of the United States.  The new paradigm overcomes the trap 
of seeking the wrong goal by pushing national security out of the realm of border security 
institutions and allows NORTHCOM to accomplish this mission. 
3. Immigration 
Chapter IV detailed how immigration has tumbled into the traps of policy 
resistance, shifting the burden to the intervener, and rule beating.  Reestablishing a 
Bracero type program, which can be referred to as a guest worker program, changes the 
system rules.  This change allows border security to transcend the above traps.  Rather 
than actively trying to prevent migrant workers illegally entering the United States, a 
guest worker program recruits those seeking temporary employment.  This breaks the 
policy resistance cycle of increased technology being responded to by deviant innovation.  
Furthermore, this policy shift directly addresses the root cause of the problem—forcing 
border security out of the shifting burden trap.  The tri-national border security agency’s 
joint border stations address the final trap of ruling beating, as described in the revenue 
and commerce section. 
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In addition to overcoming system traps, the guest worker program will have 
profound economic and security second-order effects.  Legalizing migrant workers 
allows the United States to increase its tax revenue.  Employers will no longer be forced 
to pay workers “under the table” because those workers will be working legally, enabling 
federal and state taxes to be taken from every paycheck.  Migrant workers, without the 
fear of being deported, will be empowered to frequent legitimate businesses, resulting in 
a net increase in U.S. goods consumed.  Permitting Mexican workers to freely flow 
between the United States and Mexico on a temporary basis will increase Mexican 
remittances—strengthening the Mexican economy.  The new policy will also reduce the 
number of immigrants who stay in the United States illegally from fears of having to 
attempt additional illegal border crossings.  Finally, facilitating legal immigration not 
only reduces illegal entrance attempts, but also eases the job of securing North American 
borders because those attempting to cross illegally are more likely be “bad” actors 
warranting interdiction.  
A CRS report on Mexican migration to the United States supports the 
reestablishment of a guest worker program: 
A temporary worker program could be designed to target sectors of the 
U.S. economy in which employers may struggle to recruit legal workers, 
particularly sectors in which Mexicans are concentrated…and so could 
address the “jobs magnet” that drives much unauthorized migration to the 
United States.  Some people see the “circular migration” that dominated 
the Mexico-U.S. migration system prior to the 1980s as a good model, 
with many Mexicans spending short periods of time in the United States, 
and then returning to Mexico with new job skills and money to invest in 
their home communities, rather than settling (often illegally) in the United 
States.228 
4. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement, like immigration, has descended into the system traps of policy 
resistance, shifting the burden, and rule beating.  In order to overcome these traps, the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico need to change the system’s rules by legalizing drugs.  
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Prohibition proved border security is unable to stop the flow of illegal products into a 
country where a demand remains high.  Instead of attempting to control the use of drugs 
by cutting off the supply, North American countries need to change their policies to 
prevention. 
North American countries have unsuccessfully tried to overpower the policy 
resistance trap.  Legalizing drugs, however, offers an alternative solution to the problem, 
one that has worked before on a similar problem.  Meadows writes: 
The alternative to overpowering policy resistance is so counterintuitive 
that it’s usually unthinkable.  Let go.  Give up ineffective policies.  Let the 
resources and energy spent on both enforcing and resisting be used for 
more constructive purposes.  You won’t get your way with the system, but 
it won’t go as far in a bad direction as you think, because much of the 
action you were trying to correct was in response to your own action.  If 
you calm down, those who are pulling against you will calm down too.  
This is what happened in 1933 when Prohibition ended in the United 
States; the alcohol-driven chaos also largely ended.229 
Legalizing drugs will conquer the insidious policy resistance trap, which has 
plunged Mexico into the depths of the current DTO war, by changing the rules of the 
system.  Legalizing drugs can single-handedly stop the violence and killing associated 
with the drug trade, in all three countries, with a simple stroke of a pen.  Changing the 
system’s rules will make the drug trade a legitimate enterprise performed by lawful 
businesses, stripping Mexican DTOs, along with U.S. and Canadian drug gangs, of their 
primary source of funding.  Without funds coming in from the illegal selling and 
transportation of drugs, DTOs and drug gangs will quickly become extinct.  Additionally, 
legalizing drugs will render rule beating a moot point because the transportation of drugs 
will be a legal enterprise.  All of the above effects occurred with the end of Prohibition 
and will transpire again by legalizing drugs.  
Changing drug policy from supply reduction to prevention drives border security 
out of the burden shifting system trap by focusing on the problem’s root source—
consumption.  North American countries can institute prevention programs modeled after 
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the successful anti-tobacco campaigns.  Furthermore, the narcotics market can be 
controlled via regulation, just as alcohol and tobacco are currently regulated.   
The legalization of drugs, just as the reimplementation of a guest worker program, 
will have substantial systemic second-order effects.  First, drug legalization will enhance 
federal, state, and local tax revenue by leavening excise taxes on drug sales.  The excise 
tax on cigarette’s alone attributed over $15 billion to the federal government and more 
than $17 billion to state and local coffers in 2011.230  Additionally, drug legalization will 
create the establishment of numerous legitimate businesses and provide employment 
opportunities to thousands.  These businesses and employees will pay taxes, further 
increasing federal, state, and local tax bases.  
Secondly, legalizing drugs will reduce prison populations.  The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons estimates that 47.8 percent of the U.S. prison population is incarcerated for drug 
offenses.  Currently, it costs approximately $60,000 to incarcerate one inmate for a year, 
totaling to over $63 billion a year.  Legalizing drugs, by itself, will save the United States 
close to $30 billion every year.231   
Thirdly, the regulation of drugs ensures the quality of drugs available.  This will 
prevent users from ingesting drugs that have been “cut” with more harmful substances.  
Safeguarding the quality of drugs reduces the number of overdoses and, in turn, the 
overall health care system cost.   
Finally, legalizing the drug trade eases the job of securing North American 
borders for the same reasons as the reestablishment of a guest worker program: reducing 
illegal cross border attempts and highlighting those attempting to cross as “bad” actors 
warranting interdiction. 
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The aftermath of the events of 9/11 propelled border security into the system trap 
of seeking the wrong goal.  The new paradigm drives border security out of this trap by 
changing system goals.  As with national security, terrorism is best left to those 
organizations specifically created or reorganized to combat terrorism: DHS, CIA, and 
FBI.  Successfully battling terrorism requires an intelligence-based approach.  These 
organizations have the worldwide intelligence capabilities to accomplish the mission, 
which border security agencies lack.  Moreover, this paradigm shift enables those assets 
diverted away from border security missions to reengage in more productive endeavors—
further increasing North American security. 
D. COSTS 
Chapter IV estimated the current border security system costs U.S. taxpayers over 
$37.5 billion a year.  The cost of the new system will not only by lower, but will have a 
net positive effect on the overall budget.  First, the $15.5 billion targeted for supply 
reduction can be diverted directly back into federal coffers by legalizing drugs.  Second, 
the diminished trade with Canada caused by the current system will be erased, increasing 
revenue by at least $10 billion.  Even if the United States continues to spend $12 billion 
annually on the new system, taxpayers will save $25.5 billion every year; however, given 
the elimination of 13 agencies and coordinating institutions, increased efficiency, and 
shared cost between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the system will likely cost 
American taxpayers well below $12 billion. 
In addition to direct system cost savings, the new paradigm’s secondary systemic 
effects simultaneously increases revenue and decreases expenditures.  The United States 
will save approximately $30 billion a year on incarceration alone.  The increased revenue 
gained from additional federal, state, and local taxes collected from emerging businesses 
created to support the new, legal drug trade and additional tax revenue gained from the 
reestablishment of a guest worker program is difficult to ascertain without speculation, 
therefore is excluded.  Nevertheless, this amount could conceivably contribute billions to 
federal, state, and local treasuries every year.   
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The previous system calculation omitted the $10 billion spent annually towards 
prevention.  This chapter, however, includes money aimed at prevention into its calculus.  
To cover prevention efforts, the federal government can use excise tax revenue to fund 
the entire program.  Again, saving U.S. taxpayers $10 billion per year.  This puts the total 
amount saved annually to $65.5 billion, depicted in Table 2.  The above, conservative, 
estimate lucidly shows the profound economic effect produced from the new border 
security paradigm.  
  
Supply Reduction $15.5 billion 
Increase in Trade $10 billion 
Incarceration  $30 billion 
Prevention $10 billion 
Total Savings $65.5 billion 
 
Table 2.   Cost savings produced from the advocated border security paradigm 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter addressed the border security system’s failings by projecting a new 
paradigm: jointly facilitating the efficient flow of lawful trade, travel, and immigration 
between North American countries.  This paradigm necessitates the creation of a single 
U.S. border security agency under the jurisdiction one joint congressional committee, 
establishment of a tri-national border security agency, legalization of drugs, and 
reestablishment of a guest worker program.  The forces affecting border security were 
examined through the lens of the new paradigm, detailing how the new paradigm will 
overcome system traps and produce positive systemic effects—increasing North 
American security and prosperity.  Chapter VI will discuss the barriers to 
implementation, how to overcome these barriers, and feasibility of the establishment of 
the new system.   
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VI. BARRIERS TO CHANGE 
This chapter provides insight to bureaucratic, political, cultural, and international 
barriers present in the system, which have to be overcome to implement the new border 
security paradigm introduced in Chapter V.  In the United States, the bureaucratic, 
political, and cultural levels form a pyramid, Figure 11, and it is argued that each level is 
dependent on change to occur at the lower level before any transformation can be 
manifested at the current level.  This chapter examines the barriers, how to surmount the 
barriers, and the feasibility of employing the new paradigm at each level. 
 
Figure 11.  Level pyramid 
Furthermore, it is argued that the new border security paradigm must be instituted 
at all levels in the United States prior to establishing the paradigm internationally with 
Canada and Mexico.  Providing a framework to initiate the formation of a tri-national 
border security agency, depicted in Figure 12. 
  

















The formation of a single, unified border security agency in the United States will 
face fierce bureaucratic resistance.  Every agency leader will fight for their organization’s 
survival and oppose any sort of restructuring that reduces their agency’s scope of 
responsibility.  Simply stated, no agency wants to yield authority or discretion to another 
in the interdependent environment of the border security system.  
1. Bureaucratic Barriers 
The most effective way for organizations to adapt is through internal changes; 
however, organizational design theory establishes that internal change is hard to achieve.  
Bounded rationality is the first reason, individuals have cognitive limits and changes that 
can improve performance are seldom identified or implemented.  The bureaucratic 
structure itself is another impediment.  The highly specialized nature of federal 
government agencies prevents transfer of knowledge between agencies and often even 
within specific agencies themselves.  The very structure designed to increase agency 
efficiency hinders the agency’s ability to learn.  Finally, time prohibits adaptation.  The 
longer an agency is established the more resistant to change the agency becomes, as 
routines and norms become firmly entrenched.232   
Zegart contends that government agencies face three additional disadvantages that 
limit internal change.  First, agencies are not faced with market competition that would 
force them to adapt.  Government organizations are designed from the beginning to be 
consistent and predictable, not built to adapt.  Second, private firms have creators that 
want the organization to succeed; whereas, government organizations are often created by 
politicians who want them to fail for political purposes.  Finally, governmental agency 
leaders are bound by legislation and do not have the freedom to change their 
organizations without going through the complex legislative process.233  
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Being bound to the legislative process is by far the most important barrier.  Even 
if the established border security institutions wanted to create a unified agency, 
legislation must be passed to implement the change.  This, however, also presents a way 
to overcome bureaucratic barriers. 
2. Overcoming Bureaucratic Barriers 
Organizational change comes from two sources—internal and external.  The 
barriers presented above make it apparent internal forces will not produce the needed 
reforms to the border security system.  System transformation must come from external 
forces.  Zegart writes, “Government agencies are not built to change with the times.  
Because reform does not generally arise from within, it must be imposed from the 
outside.”234  Border security agencies are bound by legislation, and this is where system 
alterations must originate—supported by the pyramid argument.   
Congressional statutory reforms are required to overcome the bureaucratic 
barriers present.  Reforms will compel the border security system to implement the new 
paradigm’s structure.  Congressional reforms have been successful in transforming 
similar bureaucratic systems in the United States.  The National Security Act of 1947 
reorganized the U.S. military and intelligence community, overwhelming intense internal 
bureaucratic resistance.  Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 induced sweeping changes to the Department of Defense’s 
organization and operation, again surmounting passionate bureaucratic opposition.235   
3. Feasibility of Bureaucratic Reform 
Bureaucratic reform will not occur internally; however, congressionally mandated 
reform would force system transformation.  The feasibility of such reform is dependent 
on the will of the political system, which must overcome its own barriers in order to 
institute any systemic change to the border security regime. 
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The border security system is dependent on the political system to define its goals, 
structure, and to perform oversight—each of which must be revolutionized.  Chapter V 
detailed how the political system is the largest impediment to the border security system.  
Yet the political system also represents the best opportunity to implement the new border 
security paradigm.  New drug and immigration policies must be implemented (goals), a 
unified border security agency established (structure), and the new agency has to fall 
under the jurisdiction of one joint congressional committee (oversight).  In order to 
instigate, the political system has to conquer significant barriers for each of the suggested 
changes. 
1. Political Barriers 
New drug and immigration policies face the barrier of bounded rationality.  
Politicians have limited information and make decisions based on this information.  
Meadows explains bounded rationality: 
Bounded rationality means that people make quite reasonable decisions 
based on the information they have.  But they don’t have perfect 
information, especially about more distant parts of the system.  Fishermen 
don’t know how many fish there are, much less how many fish will be 
caught by other fishermen that same day.  We rarely see the full range of 
possibilities before us.  We often don’t foresee (or choose to ignore) the 
impacts of our actions on the whole system.  So instead of finding a long-
term optimum, we discover within our limited purview a choice we can 
live with for now, and we stick to it, changing our behavior only when 
forced to.236 
The creation of a unified border security agency and the establishment of a single 
joint congressional committee have to overcome the rational self-interest barrier.  The 
creation of a unified border security agency would mean the elimination of several 
established agencies.  This in itself is a difficult task, as Zegart contends, “Government 
agencies are notoriously hard to eliminate because there are always interest groups and 
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elected officials who have vested interests at stake.”237  Additionally, self-interest 
explains why legislators avoid reforms to begin with; reforms rarely benefit a politician’s 
constituents and will not help them get re-elected.  Finally, a joint committee entails the 
restructuring of the entire congressional oversight system.  Politicians will have to cede 
power and influence in areas they have grown accustomed to, which directly conflicts 
with their self-interest.  Zegart explains the difficulties in accomplishing government 
reform:   
[Reform] rarely happens because all organizational changes, even the best 
reforms, create winners and losers, and because the political system allows 
losers multiple opportunities to keep winners from winning completely.  
Indeed, the greater the proposed change, the stronger the resistance will 
be.  As a result, organizational adaptation almost always meets with 
defeat, becomes watered down, or gets shelved for another day, when the 
next crisis erupts.238 
2. Overcoming Political Barriers 
Transcending bounded rationality necessitates politicians stepping outside their 
limited information and obtaining a greater appreciation for the system.  They will have 
to set aside their established biases and open themselves up to new, seemingly 
unthinkable, solutions.  Doing so provides “the opportunity to look more closely at the 
feedbacks within the system, to understand the bounded rationality behind them, and to 
find a way to meet the goals of participants in the system while moving the state of the 
system in a better direction.”239  Before this occurs, the American populace must change  
its perceptions towards drugs and immigration—the pyramid argument.  If American 
attitude changes, the demand for policy reforms will incentivize politicians to implement 
the new policies. 
Surmounting the rational self-interest barrier requires active participation by the 
American public to demand change, the eruption of a crisis, or both.  The surprise attack 
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on Pearl Harbor precipitated the passing of the National Security Act of 1947, and 
numerous military failures forced the adoption of Goldwater-Nichols.240 
3. Feasibility of Political Reform 
Political reform will not occur until the American public demands it.  Policy 
reforms will likely transpire following a significant cultural shift in American perceptions 
towards drugs and immigration.  Overcoming the political self-interest needed to create a 
single border security agency and restructure the oversight system, however, will be 
difficult to achieve in the absence of a profound crisis—even if the American public 
demands such changes.  Moreover, if a crisis does occur, the resulting changes will most 
likely further complicate the system by creating additional bureaucracies and expanding 
the quantity of oversight committees, rather than simplifying the system by reducing the 
number of agencies and streamlining the oversight process.  This is precisely how the 
political system reacted following 9/11. 
C. CULTURAL 
The cultural level forms the foundation of the pyramid; before any system 
changes are manifested American public opinion towards immigration and drugs must 
change. This presents a significant challenge because many Americans’ views are deeply 
entrenched.  Furthermore, Americans have to come to understand how dysfunctional the 
present border security system is before they demand the creation of a unified border 
security agency or support a tri-national border security agency.   
1. Cultural Barriers 
American bounded rationality is the most significant barrier to cultural change.  
The Pew Research Center found 77 percent of Americans believe border security should 
be tightened to crack down on illegal immigration.  American concerns stem from the 
long-standing beliefs that illegal immigration places additional burden on government 
services (40 percent) and that illegal immigrants steal American jobs (27 percent).  
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Furthermore, only 46 percent believe immigration is a top policy priority, well behind the 
economy (87 percent) and jobs (84 percent).241 
There are few polls gauging American perceptions on the topic of legalizing all 
drugs; yet the view towards marijuana is changing.  Figure 13 represents the shifting 
American opinion concerning marijuana legalization from 1969 to 2010.  Only 
52 percent of Americans opposed the general legalization of marijuana in 2010, a 
significant decrease from the 84 percent who resisted legalization in 1969.  American 
attitude towards the legalization of all drugs, however, is assumed to be much lower.242 
 
Figure 13.  U.S. public opinion of marijuana use (From Pew Research Service, 2010) 
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American ignorance on the current dysfunctional state of the border security 
system is an even greater barrier to institutional change.  The only voices supporting 
increased collaboration and possible structural changes have come from academics, well 
beyond the scope of average citizens.   
2. Overcoming Cultural Barriers 
Vanquishing American bounded rationality requires moving public opinion 
beyond its current 19th century mentality.  This mentality insists the answer to 
immigration is greater enforcement along the border, and stopping the flow of drugs into 
the United States can solve the drug problem.  Looking at these problems through a 
systems perspective, however, Chapter IV detailed how this mentality actually drives the 
system further from reaching its goals. 
Two possibilities exist, which, if implemented, may make it possible to overcome 
Americans’ bounded rationality: social movement or system changes that alter systemic 
feedbacks received by the public.  The most promising course of action is the creation of 
a social movement, defined as a group of people sharing a collective identity with a 
specific view contrasting another view who mobilize to achieve a political goal, aimed at 
instilling a systemic understanding of immigration and drug issues into the American 
public’s mind.  Additionally, this movement must expose the dysfunctional border 
security apparatus so every American can grasp its failings.  This new outlook may 
enable Americans to see how immigration and drug issues, along with a poorly designed 
border security apparatus, are interconnected with economic and employment issues, 
rather than viewing them as distinct problems.  Moreover, Americans might be able to 
comprehend how the proposed unified border security agency and new immigration and 
drug policies will positively affect the economy and job market.  If this occurs, 
Americans could be driven to demand the system changes introduced in Chapter V. 
Social movements have changed the world countless times by driving public 
discourse, changing perceptions, and increasing knowledge—knowledge is power.  The 
United States has a long history of successful social movements, which forever altered 
the course of America.  The civil rights movement, women’s suffrage, and Prohibition 
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are just a few examples, and it can be argued that the push for American independence 
from England started out as a social movement.  A possible scenario for the creation of 
such a social movement could begin with a documentary film or YouTube video.  If the 
film, or video, becomes widely discussed in social media, such as Twitter or Facebook, 
conventional media will report on the issue.  This, in turn, creates a positive enforcing 
feedback loop compelling more people to watch the documentary—further driving public 
discourse and increasing knowledge.  
The other course of action, systemic changes that strike at the root of Americans’ 
belief system, is already occurring.  President Barack Obama, in 2012, signed an 
executive order allowing illegal immigrants who entered the United States as children to 
remain in the country legally for two years if they apply for “deferred action.”  The 
system, however, quickly responded when 10 federal immigration agents filed a lawsuit 
claiming the directive forces them to violate federal law and is unconstitutional—an 
example of compensating feedback.  The program remains highly controversial, and 
rather than changing perceptions, both sides have become further entrenched in their 
beliefs.243  
Every president since Ronald Reagan has also broached the reestablishment of a 
guest worker program.  Most recently by President Bush who proposed a Mexico specific 
program in 2001; yet the events of 9/11 and the ensuing border crackdown shattered any 
hope of such a program being implemented.244 
3. Feasibility of Cultural Change 
In the absence of a social movement or systemic changes, American public 
opinion towards immigration or the border security system will not change, and 
Americans will be unable to move beyond their bounded rationality.  The likelihood of 
creating a social movement or implementing lasting systemic changes that can positively 
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alter feedbacks the public receives, however, are low for three reasons.  First, a 
movement would require a substantial amount of money, time, and effort; there are no 
established organizations willing to incur this cost.  Second, no politician will advocate 
for such drastic immigration policy changes because of the prevailing attitude regarding 
immigration.  Doing so would greatly reduce the chances for election or reelection.  Nor 
will politicians promote structural changes to the border security system based on their 
own bounded rationality, self-interest, and American obliviousness to the system’s 
failings.  Finally, the established border security agencies rely on the continuance of the 
status quo for their survival.  Introducing a new systemic perspective directly conflicts 
with their rational self-interest, and they will lash out against any prospective changes—
as seen with the lawsuit questioning the constitutional legality of Obama’s “deferred 
action” executive directive.  Consequently, the feasibility of the American public 
demanding structural transformation to the border security system or immigration policy 
changes is highly doubtful.  
Yet, the possibility does exist for the current immigration policy changes to alter 
American belief systems.  If Obama’s “deferred action” policy is allowed to continue and 
the positive economic impacts are clearly proven, American public opinion will slowly 
change.  Though it could take several years before public opinion manifests into a 
demand for more substantial immigration changes in the form of a guest worker program, 
and even longer before this demand affects legislation.  Even if a majority of Americans 
do not change their beliefs, vocal minorities in key swing states forcing immigration 
issues as priority could alter the reward system making legislative changes possible by 
shifting the balance of power.   
Public perception towards drug legalization, however, is shifting—albeit only 
concerning marijuana.  Currently, 18 states and the District of Columbia have legalized 
medical marijuana use.  If this trend continues, it is only a matter of time before medical 
marijuana is legal throughout the United States, forcing the federal government to 
reconsider its stance on marijuana.245   
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The next logical step is the complete legalization of marijuana, which has already 
occurred in Washington and Colorado.  Voters in these states overwhelmingly approved 
complete marijuana legalization during the 2012 election, potentially triggering a 
constitutional showdown with the federal government.  Moreover, California’s 
Proposition 19, which would have legalized marijuana, was narrowly defeated in 2010.  It 
is clear American attitude towards marijuana is shifting.246  
If the above states prevail over federal protest, the systemic effects discussed in 
Chapter V will take place.  Once these effects occur, numerous other states will pass 
similar legislation and possibly drive future discourse beyond marijuana to the 
legalization of all drugs.  Therefore, the feasibility of changing drug policy in the United 
States is promising, at least pertaining to marijuana.  But even this is a step in the right 
direction. 
D. INTERNATIONAL 
Establishing a tri-national border security agency represents the apex of 
successful North American border security strategy.  Surprisingly, only a few 
international barriers will have to be surmounted before a tri-national agency is created.  
Moreover, these barriers present much less of a challenge when compared to the domestic 
barriers existing in the United States.  
1. International Barriers 
The most significant international barrier is the need for the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico to establish parallel immigration and drug policies.  Without policy 
synchronization a tri-national border security agency cannot be created.  The United 
States and Mexico must also move beyond reciprocal mistrust and Mexican concerns 
over U.S. unilateralism and violations of Mexican sovereignty, which have plagued 
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bilateral cooperation attempts in the past.247  Finally, Canadian fears over the impacts of 
a tri-national border system have to be overcome.  Joel Sokolsky and Philippe Lagasse 
write: 
Ottawa’s other motive for resisting a perimeter is the fear that, if a 
trilateral North American security regime is constructed, the United States 
will apply uniform policies at the Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. 
borders…the result of this conflation would be a Mexicanization of the 
northern border, perhaps leading to a massive increase of American 
surveillance and inspection efforts along the 49th parallel…the Canadian 
government is determined to block any development that could accelerate 
this process.248  
2. Overcoming International Barriers 
Synchronizing U.S., Canadian, and Mexican immigration and drug policies will 
be relatively easy, assuming the United States changes its policies before attempting to 
establish a tri-national agency.  First, Canada and Mexico already have a proven guest 
worker program established, which the CRS lauds as a “best-practice model.”249  Second, 
medical marijuana is already legal throughout Canada and two-thirds of Canadians 
support complete legalization.250  Finally, Mexico is even closer to legalizing drugs.  
Enrique Pena Nieto, Mexico’s president-elect, has publicly stated Mexico should discuss 
legalizing drugs and regulating their sale.251  Additionally, former Mexican Presidents 
Vicente Fox and Ernest Zedillo have gone on record supporting the legalization 
argument.252  In the near future, drugs may be legal in both Canada and Mexico, even in 
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the face of U.S. pressure to maintain the status quo.  If, however, the United States 
supports legalization, Mexico and Canada will most likely willingly follow suit. 
U.S.-Mexican relations are beginning to move beyond the reciprocal mistrust, 
unilateralism, and sovereignty violation concerns.  The New York Times reports Mexican 
commandos are staging missions from the United States, American Predator and Global 
Hawk drones flying deep into Mexico, and intelligence outposts, manned by CIA and 
DEA operatives, on Mexican military bases.253  Furthermore, the Merida Initiative has 
fostered increased cooperation between the United States and Mexico.  Proposing a tri-
national border security agency, including joint border stations, will enable Mexicans to 
view themselves as equal partners with the United States and Canada—crushing the 
perceptions of mistrust, U.S. unilateralism, and sovereignty violations. 
Canadian fears of increased American surveillance and inspection efforts 
associated with a tri-national border regime will be erased if the new border security 
paradigm is implemented domestically.  Canada is primarily concerned with the 
economic impacts to any border security change, given nearly ninety percent of Canada’s 
exports go to the United States.254  The proposed paradigm will facilitate the flow of 
commerce; therefore, Canada will enthusiastically support the establishment of a tri-
national border security agency. 
3. Feasibility of a Tri-national Border Security Agency 
The fate of a tri-national border security agency rests solely on the ability of the 
United States to change its view on border security, along with its immigration and drug 
policies.  Both Mexico and Canada already have the immigration policies in place and are 
close to legalizing drugs.  The positive economic effects of the new system, alone, will 
easily overpower any international trepidation.  If the United States can transcend the 
barriers detailed above, Mexico and Canada will be eager participants in a tri-national 
border security agency—increasing North American security and prosperity.   
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis employed meta-policy and policy process approaches, integrating 
multiple disciplines, to examine the border security environment in order to project a new 
paradigm that will increase North American security.  The meta-policy approach 
explained the political and bureaucratic factors affecting the border security system’s 
structure, and the policy process approach was used to clarify the role and influence of 
stakeholders within the policy process.  
This chapter summarizes the findings to answer the research questions posed in 
Chapter I; provides suggested recommendations, which, if implemented, will increase 
North American security; stipulates the feasibility of applying the recommendations; and 
finally, proposes several areas of continued research. 
A. FINDINGS 
This section answers the two primary research questions established in Chapter I, 
along with the secondary questions presented in the problems and hypotheses section. 
1. What is the Goal of U.S. Border Security, and How Can It Be 
Improved to Accomplish this Goal? 
Chapter III examined the evolving goals of border security and discovered six 
forces that have shaped the system’s structure and goals throughout U.S. history—
revenue, commerce, national security, immigration, law enforcement, and terrorism.  The 
initial hypothesis was that before 9/11 border security was focused on illegal 
immigration, switched to terrorism after 9/11, and now is transforming to stemming the 
flow of drugs.  Chapter III, however, found that prior to 9/11 law enforcement, in the 
form of stopping illegal drugs, was the preeminent goal of border security.  Following 
9/11, the primary goal was stopping terrorism, which continues to be the priority today.  
More importantly, it was noticed that commerce, not law enforcement, is slowly 
reestablishing itself as a priority.  
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Before projecting a new structure to improve the effectiveness of the border 
security apparatus in achieving its goals, the current system shape and its effectiveness 
had to be analyzed.  Chapter II assessed the current border security framework and 
attempted to determine which, if any, agency leads U.S. border security efforts.  The 
preliminary hypotheses were the proliferation of agencies involved in border security 
limits U.S. endeavors and that no single agency has the overall lead in border security.  
Chapter II confirmed the initial hypotheses, concluding that the current border security 
system, represented by Figure 4, lacks any clear lead agency and the abundance of 
agencies and interconnecting institutions further dilutes and prevents any coherent 
centralized system control.  
The literature review provided numerous examples from research institutions 
criticizing the border security system for its lack of coordination, collaboration, and 
information sharing.  The U.S. border security establishment was surveyed using 
complexity theory and a systems approach to determine why the system is ineffective in 
Chapter IV.  The chapter argued border security has succumbed to several system traps: 
policy resistance, escalation, shifting the burden to the intervener, rule beating, and 
seeking the wrong goal.  Additionally, it was contended that the mechanistic bureaucratic 
system in place is ineffective at confronting the complexity and complex adaptive 
systems present along borders.  Moreover, it was estimated that it costs U.S. taxpayers 
over $37.5 billion a year for an ineffective border security system. 
Chapter V, applying complexity theory, a systems approach, and the concept of 
leverage points, projected a new border security paradigm that will enable the border 
security system to overcome system traps by changing the current system’s rules, 
structures, and goals.  Chapter V insisted the border security paradigm, or mindset, needs 
to change from stopping terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug interdiction to jointly 
facilitating the efficient flow of lawful trade, travel, and immigration between North 
American countries.  Accompanying this new paradigm, two significant policy changes 
were argued: legalization of drugs and reinstatement of a guest worker program.  Finally, 
Chapter V estimated the implementation of the new paradigm would save U.S. taxpayers 
over $65.5 billion annually. 
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Chapter IV maintained the current bureaucratic and political structure severely 
hampers border security effectiveness.  Chapter V introduced a new structure, which, 
combined with the new system paradigm, will increase North American security.  
Addressing the bureaucratic structure, the establishment of a single U.S. border security 
agency was argued.  This new agency should be created using an adhocracy model to 
adequately address the complexities of the border security environment and base its 
strategy formulation on Mintzberg’s learning school.  Finally, it was stated that the 
agency has to move from DHS into the Department of Commerce to align the new 
agency with the paradigm shift of jointly facilitating the efficient flow of lawful trade, 
travel, and immigration between North American countries. 
Chapter IV asserted the greatest impediment to border security is the political 
system itself.  Chapter V argues the new agency has to fall under the jurisdiction of one 
joint congressional committee.  This will reduce the number of veto points during the 
legislative process, limiting the amount of compromises affecting the goals and means to 
address problems.  Furthermore, having centralized congressional control enables the 
creation of coherent, consistent system goals.   
Introducing a new paradigm, along with changing the bureaucratic and political 
structures, will improve the U.S. border security system’s ability to accomplish its goals.  
Moreover, the new system will save enormous amounts of money, while at the same time 
increasing North American security. 
2. Would a Tri-national—United States, Canadian, and Mexican—
Border Security Agency, Developed Using Complexity Theory and a 
Systems Approach, Be more Effective and Cost-efficient in Securing 
North American Borders, and What Are the Roadblocks for the 
Establishment of Such an Agency? 
The level of international cooperation had to be examined before answering the 
question on whether a tri-national agency would be more effective and cost-efficient in 
securing North American borders.  The preliminary hypotheses were the level of 
international cooperation had to be increased to provide for more effective border 
security, and the treatment of U.S. northern and southern borders as separate entities has 
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led to confusion and a disjointed comprehensive border security plan.  Chapter IV largely 
confirmed these hypotheses.  While it was found that the United States does have an 
adequate relationship with Canadian authorities, U.S.-Mexican cooperation remains 
anemic.  Chapter IV concluded that the treatment of the northern and southern borders as 
separate entities prevents the establishment of any coherent border security goal, creates 
confusion among border security agencies, and instills disparate goals into the system.  
Chapter V argued that the paradigm shift necessitates the establishment of a tri-
national agency, which will synchronize commerce policies between North American 
countries—increasing the efficiency of trade, travel, and immigration.  Chapter V also 
insisted the agency’s strategy formulation should be based on collaborative planning, 
supported by the Cynefin framework.  Collaborative planning will overcome barriers by 
establishing common goals, recognizing interdependence, formalizing relationships, and 
creating lateral mechanisms.  Doing so enables all three countries to move beyond merely 
sharing information into the realm of jointly creating information.  
Chapter V discussed the systemic effects of the establishment of a tri-national 
border security agency.  This discussion lucidly showed that a tri-national border security 
agency, along with drug legalization and establishment of a guest worker program, would 
be more effective and cost-efficient in securing North American borders. 
Chapter VI explored the roadblocks that must be overcome in order to establish a 
tri-national border security agency.  The initial hypothesis was the current highly partisan 
political environment in all three North American democracies and persistent domestic 
mistrust present would prohibit the establishment of a true tri-national agency.  Yet it was 
found that few international barriers are present in the system, and these barriers can be 
easily overcome if the United States is able to surmount its internal obstacles.  The 
following were the roadblocks discovered: establishment of parallel immigration and 
drug polices; United States and Mexican reciprocal mistrust; Mexican concerns over U.S. 
unilateralism and violations of Mexican sovereignty; and Canadian economic fears. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Examining the border security system through the lens of complexity theory and a 
systems approach, this thesis recommends three actions to be implemented that will 
vastly increase North American security and prosperity. 
1. Paradigm Shift 
The first recommendation, as well as the most important, is that the border 
security paradigm needs to change from stopping terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug 
interdiction to jointly facilitating the efficient flow of lawful trade, travel, and 
immigration between North American countries.  Additionally, two significant policy 
changes are recommended: legalization of drugs and reinstatement of a guest worker 
program.   
Legalizing drugs, by itself, greatly simplifies the system’s shape by removing 
DTOs, gangs, and drug users from the system.  Furthermore, this policy shift forces the 
following drug enforcement agencies, agencies performing drug related activities, and 
drug coordination agencies out of the border security system’s realm: DEA, NDIC, FBI, 
Department of Treasury, Bank of Mexico, Mexico’s Finance and Credit, SIU, HIDTA, 
OCDETF, and ONDCP.  Figure 9 represents the border security system’s shape 
following the legalization of drugs. 
2. Unified U.S. Border Security Agency 
The second recommendation is to combine the five remaining border security 
agencies—OFO, USBP, CBP, ICE, and ATF—into a single, unified border security 
agency within the Department of Commerce.  This enables DHS to focus solely on 
terrorism, USCG to perform national security activities, and DOJ to concentrate on law 
enforcement.  Additionally, the establishment of a unified agency eliminates redundant 
internal coordination agencies: ACTT, SWB Initiative, and EPIC.  This new agency 
should be developed using an adhocracy structure and base its strategy formulation on 
Mintzberg’s learning school.  Moreover, it is critical that the new agency fall under the 
jurisdiction of one joint congressional committee. 
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3. Tri-national Border Security Agency 
The final recommendation is the establishment of a tri-national border security 
agency.  The border security system’s paradigm shift demands the creation of such an 
agency to synchronize commerce policies and enforcement between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico.  This agency, in order to adequately address the complexities of the 
border security environment, should use collaborative planning methods for its strategy 
formulation.   
A tri-national agency consolidates IBET and BEST coordination agencies into a 
single entity.  The end result, depicted in Figure 10, is a border security apparatus 
containing one U.S. agency, one Mexican agency, and two Canadian agencies whose 
efforts are coordinated through a single institution. 
C. FEASIBILITY 
The fate of a tri-national border security agency rests solely on the ability of the 
United States to change its view on border security, along with its immigration and drug 
policies.  Both Mexico and Canada already have the immigration policies in place and are 
close to legalizing drugs.  The positive economic effects of the new system, alone, will 
easily overpower any international trepidation.  If the United States can transcend the 
barriers detailed in Chapter VI, Mexico and Canada will be eager participants in a tri-
national border security agency—increasing North American security and prosperity.  
Yet the likelihood of the United States being able to overcome its bureaucratic, political, 
and cultural barriers is relatively minuscule; therefore, the feasibility of establishing a tri-
national border security agency is improbable at this time. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis examined the border security system through a meta-analysis 
approach.  To further the research into the proposed system changes, it is suggested that a 
microanalysis be initiated on the stocks and flows for each system component.  
Specifically, a study on the systemic effects of established tobacco companies selling  
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drugs and using their lobbying tools to influence Congress is warranted.  Additionally, a 
study on the internal framework of a unified U.S. border security agency and tri-national 
agency should be instigated.  
A case study of Europe’s Schengen border agreement within the context of the 
potential effects of a tri-national border security framework will also further the 
discourse.  Furthermore, a case study on the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act would 
shed light on possible approaches to overcome established bureaucratic and political 
barriers. 
It is suggested that a sociological study be commenced to examine the specifics of 
the creation of a social movement to overcome the cultural barriers introduced in Chapter 
VI.  Finally, a study on the effects of drug legalization concerning drug use, crime, and 
associated tax revenue would provide additional support to this thesis’s 
recommendations.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis addressed the U.S. border security system using complexity theory and 
a systems approach, incorporating both borders and all associated border security 
institutions simultaneously.  Border security research has rarely viewed all stakeholders 
as a holistic unit up to this point, nor has border security been thoroughly examined using 
a systems approach.  This research scrutinized the current U.S. border security paradigm 
in an attempt to determine its effectiveness in securing U.S. borders.  Additionally, the 
research investigated the current level of international cooperation between the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico.   
This thesis increases awareness and will possibly create dissent among established 
agencies, which is the first step in instituting needed changes that will ultimately increase 
North American security.  The recommendations presented provide U.S., Canadian, and 
Mexican governmental leaders with a proposal to improve collaboration and 
effectiveness for border security management.  
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The governments and citizens of all countries have stakes in this objective and 
must care about addressing the threats to North American security.  Specifically, this 
thesis predominantly concerns the agencies affected and border residents.  The difference 
the thesis makes, if successful, is increased North American security through policies and 
practices that reduce violence, curtail DTO activities, and limit illegal border crossings 
that smuggle drugs, cash, weapons, and persons.  Impacts will be felt by citizens of all 
three countries, primarily those living along the U.S.-Mexican border who will be able to 
go about their daily lives without fear of being caught in the current crucible of violence. 
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